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CONSUMER PROVISIONS IN REVISED ARTICLE 9
MARION

W. BENFIELD, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

A. Scope of This Article
This article discusses the provisions of Revised Article 9 that
apply to consumer-debtor' secured transactions. It will not recount in

detail the various interim positions taken by the Drafting Committee
during the drafting process nor will it describe in detail the process by
which the Committee decided to include the consumer provisions that
are discussed here. However, it begins with a brief description of the
process used by the Committee in considering consumer issues.
B. Brief Descriptionof the Process Used To Develop Consumer
Debtor Provisionsin Revised Article 9
The question of how to deal with consumer transactions2 was one

of the major concerns in the revision of Article 9. The reasons for the
concern were both substantive and political. As a substantive matter,
many consumers are ill-equipped to understand, or to bargain about,
provisions in contracts, including security agreements, that may
adversely affect them. Similarly, defaulting consumers may need
* University Distinguished Chair in Law Emeritus, Wake Forest University School of
Law; Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Illinois College of Law;
Visiting Professor, University of Texas at Austin School of Law, Spring, 1999. Professor
Benfield was a member of the Drafting Committee that drafted Revised Article 9 and was Chair
of the Consumer Subcommittee. All the views expressed in this article are his own and do not
represent the views of the Drafting Committee or of the Consumer Subcommittee.
1. Revised Article 9 adopts new terminology to describe the parties to a secured
transaction. The person who is obligated on the debt is termed the "obligor"; the person who
grants a security interest in the collateral is termed the "debtor." See R. § 9-102(a)(28), (59). Of
course, in most cases, the same person will owe the debt and give the interest in the collateral
and so will be both obligor and debtor. In this article I will use the term debtor to describe both.
2. Revised section 9-102(26) defines a consumer transaction as follows: "'Consumer
transaction' means a transaction in which (i) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, (ii) a security interest secures the obligation, and (iii)
the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The
term includes consumer-goods transactions."
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more information and more protection from possible debtor
overreaching than commercial borrowers. Therefore, as a policy
matter, additional or different rules especially protective of
consumers may be justified. As a political matter, recent experience
with Article 2A and with Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") indicates that significant consumer group
opposition to proposed UCC changes may delay or prevent
enactment. 3 At the same time, it was understood that securing
uniform adoption of a Revised Article 9 with substantial additional
special consumer provisions would be difficult. The initial report of
the Article 9 Consumer Subcommittee 4 issued in 1996 put the
problem as follows:
An important fact in regard to consumer provisions is that the
Conference [the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (the "National Conference")] has not been
particularly successful in securing adoptions of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code which contains many consumer protective
provisions similar to those being proposed by consumer groups for
Article 9. The experience with the Consumer Credit Code teaches
us that it is very difficult to reach a national consensus on consumer
issues which is acceptable in the various states. The differences in
social, economic, and political conditions in the states are
sufficiently great that rules that in one state are seen as
insufficiently protective of consumer interests are seen in another
as unjustified interference with market forces. Therefore, the
drafting participants must recognize that the question of coverage
of consumer issues in Article 9 involves not only a judgment as to
the best substantive rule, but also a judgment regarding whether
there is sufficient consensus on the appropriate substantive rule
outside the Conference and the American Law Institute (ALI) that
a decision made by the Conference and the ALI would be
acceptable. Therefore, provisions which the sponsoring
organizations believe substantively desirable might nevertheless
not be included in Article 9 because of enactability concerns.'
The concerns expressed by the Consumer Subcommittee were
particularly important because Article 9 has been adopted in all
3. See Fred H. Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper Formula, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 187, 195-99 (1997).
4. Creation of the Consumer Issues Subcommittee is discussed infra at text accompanying
note 7. Members of the Subcommittee were Henry Kittleson (Commissioner from Florida),
Sandra Stern (Commissioner from New York), Neil Cohen (American Law Institute), and
Marion Benfield (Chair, Commissioner from North Carolina).
5. Report of the Consumer Issues Subcommittee of the UCC Article 9 Drafting
Committee (issued May 29, 1996), reprinted in 50 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 332, 332 (1996)
[hereinafter The Report].
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jurisdictions and Revised Article 9, it is hoped, will be quickly and
uniformly adopted in all jurisdictions. A move from the present neartotal uniformity to lack of uniformity would be unfortunate.
The Chair of the Drafting Committee, William Burke, wanted to
get the best possible input in developing consumer proposals for
Revised Article 9. He therefore wanted strong consumer debtor and
consumer creditor representation in the groups that advised the
Drafting Committee. Early in the process he appointed a Consumer
Issues Task Force, which he hoped would lead to jointly supported
recommendations.6 That Task Force met a number of times between
1993 and 1995. The Task Force discussed various proposals, but never
reached agreement on a joint position. Therefore, in 1995 a
Consumer Subcommittee of the full Drafting Committee was
appointed by the Executive Committee of the Conference to work
with Task Force members in an attempt to achieve a set of proposals
that made sense economically and socially and with which both sides
could agree.7
The Consumer Subcommittee found that the consumer and
creditor representatives were far apart in their views as to desirable
consumer provisions in Article 9. Consumer representatives made a
number of proposals for additional consumer protections in Article 9;
particularly for additional consumer rights during the Article 9
foreclosure process, and for additional remedies when a creditor fails
to comply with Article 9 foreclosure requirements. Among their
major requests were (1) attorneys' fees for consumer plaintiffs who
prevail on a claim that a creditor failed to comply with Article 9
foreclosure requirements, (2) an absolute-bar rule prohibiting
recovery of any deficiency if the creditor fails to comply with the
foreclosure requirements, (3) a right to reinstate the debt after
repossession by making past due payments, and (4) a post sale notice
of the debt, the proceeds of the sale, the costs of sale, and the
resulting deficiency or surplus.
At the same time, consumer creditor representatives strongly
argued against additional consumer rights or remedies in Article 9
6. The Task Force included consumer members from Consumer's Uniform, Legal
Services organizations in West Virginia and Missouri, a private practitioner with experience
representing consumers in foreclosure matters, and law professors with special interest in the
area. Creditor representatives included members from the three major automobile
manufacturer credit arms, a representative of independent finance companies, and a
representative of the California Banker's Association.
7. See Miller, supra note 3, at 200-02.
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and, to the contrary, argued that the present statutory damages
provisions for creditor failures in the consumer debtor foreclosure
process had little relationship either to actual harm to the consumer
or to reprehensibleness or willfulness of the creditor conduct. They
suggested no, or reduced, statutory damages, and a good faith defense
to any statutory damages. The consumer creditors (largely
automobile finance creditors) also made the point that while other
creditor groups might stand to gain from the changes being made by
the revision of Article 9, they were happy with Current Article 9 and
saw no off-setting gain to them in Revised Article 9 to counterbalance additional burdens imposed on them in consumer
transactions.
Even though creditors objected to some of the consumer
provisions of Current Article 9, they had in practice accepted them
and there had been no strong outcry against them from trade groups.
Therefore, the Consumer Subcommittee adopted as a basic guideline
that Revised Article 9 should not diminish present consumer rights
and remedies. The issue, therefore, was how many, if any, additional
consumer protection provisions should be added to Article 9.
Consumer creditors, of course, saw the initial decision not to lessen
present existing consumer provisions of Article 9 as tilting the playing
field in favor of consumers. Creditors were left to fight against
changes urged by consumers while consumers did not have the
burden of fighting to preserve the pro-consumer provisions already in
the Code.
The Consumer Subcommittee, after a number of meetings with
creditor and consumer representatives, presented a number of
proposed new provisions giving special treatment to consumer
transactions. The most important of those provisions were a
reciprocal attorney's fee provision giving a consumer who established
that a creditor had violated Article 9 requirements attorney's fees if
the security agreement provided attorney's fees for the creditor; a
provision for reinstatement of the debt after repossession by making
past due payments and an additional deposit; and a provision leaving
to the courts the issue whether denial of a deficiency was an
appropriate remedy for a creditor failure to comply with the
foreclosure rules of Article 9.8 The Subcommittee also made a

8. See The Report, supra note 5, at 333-37.
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number of other less important proposals.9 All proposals made by the
Consumer Subcommittee were essentially accepted by the Drafting
Committee, the American Law Institute ("ALI"), and the National
Conference at their annual meetings in 1996.
Creditor representatives strongly objected to the pro-consumer
provisions that were adopted by the National Conference and the
ALI. It appeared that, if those provisions remained in the revision,
there would be strong opposition from consumer creditors in the
enactment process. Therefore, the Drafting Committee and the
sponsoring organizations, particularly the National Conference,
concluded that a new effort should be made to produce a set of
Article 9 consumer provisions that would be acceptable to both
consumer and creditor representatives. Therefore, that effort got
under way and after a series of intensive meetings, in some of which
Consumer Subcommittee representatives met separately with the
consumer and the creditor groups, a final set of proposals was agreed
to by both parties. It is fair to say that neither group was happy with
the proposals, but both believed that the proposals agreed to were
such that neither group would oppose adoption of Revised Article 9
and the Drafting Committee and sponsoring organizations believed
that the proposals that finally emerged were acceptable on public
policy grounds.
A significant factor in the decision to accept a set of proposals
less far reaching than the Drafting Committee and sponsoring
organizations had accepted at one time was the historical difficulty of
securing wide-spread state enactment of consumer credit legislation.
The National Conference's major effort in this area was the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, which was promulgated in 1968 with an
amended version promulgated in 1974.10 That act contains a number
of provisions similar to those that consumer representatives asked to
be included in Revised Article 9. However, the Consumer Credit
Code has been adopted in only eleven jurisdictions and, even in those
jurisdictions, often with substantial changes. Therefore, there was
doubt that similar provisions would be acceptable in most states as
part of Revised Article 9.
9. See generally id. at 332.
10. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1968 Act), 7 U.L.A. 475 (1997); UNIF.
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1974 Act), 7A U.L.A. 1 (1995).
11. The states are Colorado, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Utah, and
Wyoming (1968 act); and Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, and Maine (1974 act).
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I. TRANSACTIONS THAT ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONSUMER RULES
OF REVISED ARTICLE 9

Current Article 9 does not define "consumer" or "consumer
transaction." It does define "consumer goods" as goods that are used

12
or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household use,
and there are some special consumer protection rules in Current
Article 9 which apply to transactions in which the collateral is

consumer goods.13 Under Current Article 9, the purpose of the

extension of credit is irrelevant. Therefore, a business purpose credit
is subject to the consumer rules if the collateral is consumer goods.
Revised Article 9 has a more complex set of consumer rules.
Under the new act, there are three different categories of

goods
"consumer
transactions,"
"consumer
transactions:
transactions," and 14other transactions in which the collateral is
"consumer goods.' A "consumer transaction" is one in which the
credit secured is for a personal, family, or household purpose, and the
collateral is personal, family, or household collateral." The collateral

can be an intangible, such as an interest in a mutual fund, so long as
the interest is held for personal, family, or household purposes. 16 A

"consumer goods transaction" is a transaction in which the credit
secured is for a personal, family, or household purpose and the
collateral is consumer goods. 7 Finally, some provisions of Revised

Article 9 apply to transactions entered into for business purposes if
the collateral is consumer goods. 8
12. "Goods are (1) 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes." U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
13. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-204(2) (limitation on effectiveness of after-acquired property clause),
9-507 (statutory damages for failure to follow required foreclosure procedures).
14. See R. § 9-102(a)(24), (26), (27).
15. "'Consumer transaction' means a transaction in which (i) an individual incurs an
obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, (ii) a security interest secures
the obligation, and (iii) the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. The term includes consumer-goods transactions." Id. § 9-102(a)(26).
16. See id. The last sentence of section 9-102(a)(26) implies that transactions secured by
consumer intangibles fall within the definition. There are substantive provisions that apply to
consumer intangible secured transactions.
17. "'Consumer goods' means goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes" Id. § 9-102(a)(23). "'Consumer-goods transaction' means a
transaction in which: (A) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes; and (B) a security interest in consumer goods secures the obligation." ld.
§ 9-102(a)(24).
18. For example, the statutory damages imposed by Revised section 9-625(c) for failure to
comply with the foreclosure requirements of Revised Article 9 apply to a transaction in which
the collateral is consumer goods. Its application is not limited to transactions in which the credit
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In the substantive sections of Revised Article 9, the terms
"consumer transaction" and "consumer-goods transaction" are
always used in their defined sense. Therefore, when a section applies
a special rule to a "consumer transaction," the section covers
consumer purpose credit secured by consumer collateral, including
consumer intangible collateral. If a section covers a "consumer-goods
transaction," it covers consumer purpose credit secured by consumer
goods but not consumer purpose credit which is secured only by
consumer intangibles. If a section covers situations in which the
collateral is "consumer goods," it applies to any transaction whether
or not the credit was extended for consumer purposes, if the collateral
is consumer goods. Therefore, the reader must carefully note the
particular phrase used in the section to determine its coverage.
Similarly, in this article, the terms will be used in their defined sense
and will not always call the reader's attention to the specific meaning
of the term used.
Providing different rules for debts secured by consumer
intangibles than for debts secured by non-consumer intangibles
presents a new interpretive difficulty in Article 9, particularly for
investment property held by owners of individual proprietorships. In
one sense, all the property of most sole proprietorships is held for
personal, family, or household purposes because the purpose of the
business is to produce income for the proprietor or her family.
However, that interpretation of "personal, family, or household use"
would largely obliterate the distinction consumer and non-consumer
debt of individuals. Credit extended for the operation of a business is
not consumer debt and even consumer goods or consumer intangibles
taken as security would not make the transaction a consumer
transaction (though as noted above, some provisions of Revised
Article 9 apply to transactions secured by consumer goods even
though the credit was not for consumer purposes).
However, in cases where the debt is for a consumer purpose,
there can be difficulty in deciding whether particular intangibles are
held for personal, family, or household purposes. Presumably, if a
sole proprietor has a separate checking account for the business, the
checking account is not held for personal, family, or household
purposes. But if the checking account is used for both business and
personal, family, or household purposes, the test becomes whether
was extended for a consumer purpose.
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the account is used primarily for consumer purposes. 19 Similarly, a
money market account with a mutual fund, 20 for example, might be
either for business purposes, or for personal, family, or household
purposes.
However, if the employed family members are wage earners, not
business owners, perhaps all investment, savings, and bank accounts
that are used as parking places for money until it is used, even though
the use is to be in distant retirement years, should be treated as
personal, family, or household accounts. But it is arguable that active
brokerage accounts, in which the investor tries to profit from trading
activity, are held for business purposes, just as much as the assets of a
sole proprietorship. Drawing distinctions between investments based
on the way in which the investment is managed is difficult, however,
and it is hard to predict whether courts will be willing to undertake to
draw such distinctions. A court might conclude that individual trading
accounts are always consumer intangibles.
Some persons in the drafting process suggested that a dollar limit
be set above which intangible collateral would not be treated as
consumer collateral. Such a dollar limitation would have largely
solved the line drawing problem just discussed. The dollar limitation
was not adopted because of the difficulty in deciding just where such
a line should be drawn and in structuring an inflation adjustment
factor.
II. CONSUMER FORECLOSURE ISSUES

A. Introduction
Default and foreclosure matters were of greatest concern to
consumer representatives in the drafting process. Among the issues
considered were: (1) penalties for failure of the creditor to have a
commercially reasonable sale or to give proper notice of a pending
sale; (2) required notice of a pending sale; (3) low price as evidence of
a commercially unreasonable sale; (4) protections against low price
sales to parties related to the creditor or parties against whom the
19. Revised Article 9 will govern security interests in non-consumer deposit accounts, but
not security interests in consumer deposit accounts. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying
text.
20. An account with a mutual fund is not a "deposit account" under Revised Article 9 even
though checks may be drawn against the account. See discussion infra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
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creditor has a right of recourse; (5) conditions to the ability of a
creditor to take property in satisfaction of the debt thereby avoiding
the necessity of a foreclosure sale; (6) obligation of creditors to give
debtors a post-sale notice of the way in which a deficiency was
calculated; and (7) conditions to the ability of consumer-debtors to
waive their statutory rights. These issues will be discussed below.
B. Penaltiesfor FailureTo Hold a Commercially Reasonable Sale or
Failure To Give ProperNotice of a PendingSale

1. Statutory Damages
Current section 9-507 provides that a secured party who fails to
comply with the provisions of Part 5 of Article 9 (which deals with
repossession and sale on default) is liable for any actual damage
caused. But, if the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor "has a
right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit
service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or
the time price differential plus 10 per cent of the cash price."'" During
the drafting process, consumer representatives argued that in addition
to statutory damages, a prevailing consumer should be entitled to
attorney's fees. On the other hand, creditor representatives argued
that the statutory damages have no relationship either to actual harm
caused the consumer debtor or to the egregiousness of the creditor
conduct and should be deleted or reduced except for serious
misconduct. At one point in the drafting process, the Drafting
Committee approved a reciprocal attorney's fee provision under
which a prevailing consumer could recover attorney's fees if the
security agreement provided for attorney's fees for the creditor.
However, the drafters ultimately decided to make no change in the
statutory damages provision and did not add a reciprocal attorney's
fee provision.2 2 Current Article 9 applies the statutory damages rule
when the collateral is consumer goods; the purpose of the debt is not
relevant. The revision also applies to any transaction in which the
collateral is consumer goods, thereby exactly preserving the present
rule. 23
The present statutory damages, which can be quite high,
21. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
22. See infra note 25.
23. See infra note 25.
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particularly in automobile financing, 24 to some extent create a fund
from which attorney's fees can be paid. However, both Current and
Revised Article 9 can be read to require that actual damages be off-

set against statutory damages.25 However, a court applying the

absolute bar rule 26 might conclude that in addition to denying any
27
deficiency, the debtor is entitled to recover the statutory damages. If

the theory supporting no recovery of a deficiency after a foreclosure
sale that did not comply with Article 9 requirements is that the
creditor is estopped from asserting that the collateral was worth less
than the debt, there would be no offsetting deficiency to reduce the

statutory damages. Also, a court might conclude that the statute
should be read to allow statutory damages in addition to actual

damages.
There do not seem to be any cases presently allowing actual
damages plus statutory damages except in the context of applying an
absolute bar rule. 28 However, Comment 3 to Revised section 9-625
24. If the debtor buys a $17,000 automobile and finances $15,000 of the purchase price over
four years at nine percent interest, the finance charge will be approximately $2700. The
statutory damages will be either $4400 or $4200 depending on whether the seller took back a
security agreement or a third party lender loaned the consumer the $15,000. (The statutory
formulation, in the revised language version, is that the consumer may recover for failure to
comply with the foreclosure rules "in any event an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus 10
per cent of the cash price." U.C.C. § 9-507(1).)
25. Current section 9-507(1) in pertinent part gives
a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with
the provisions of this Part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to
recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent
of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus 10 per cent of the
cash price.
Revised section 9-625(b) and (c) in pertinent part reads:
[A] person is liable for damages in the amount of any loss caused by a failure to
comply with this article....
[I]f the collateral is consumer goods, a person that was a debtor or a secondary
obligor at the time a secured party failed to comply with this part may recover for that
failure in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus 10 percent of
the principal amount of the obligation or the time-price differential plus 10 percent of
the cash price.
That language suggests that statutory damages go to offset actual damages. Therefore, as actual
damages approach or exceed statutory damages, there is less or no surplus to pay attorney's
fees. See Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 276 A.2d 402, 407 (N.J. Ocean County Ct. 1971)
(applying the setoff rule), aff'd, 288 A.2d 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
26. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
27. See Wilmington Trust Co. v Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 781 (Del. 1980); Merchandise Nat'l
Bank of Chicago v. Scanlon, 408 N.E.2d 248, 252-53 (Ill. App. 1980).
28. For a general discussion see BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 12.05[5][d], at 12-55 (rev. ed. 1993).
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states that "the statute is silent as to whether a double recovery or
other over-compensation is possible in a consumer transaction." That
comment invites a court to consider whether statutory damages might
be awarded in addition to actual damages. If statutory damages are
viewed as a substitute for a statutory attorney's fee provision, such a
"double recovery" might be justified even if the court does not apply
an absolute bar rule.
In situations where the debtor and the obligor are not the same
person,29 a court might be convinced to award the statutory damages
to each of them, thereby doubling the secured party's liability.
However, that possibility is negated by Revised section 9-628(e).
Also, the section negates dual liability in cases where the secured
party is guilty of multiple violations of the foreclosure rules in Part 6.
That section provides that the creditor is liable for the statutory
damages only once. 30
2. Possible Bar of Recovery of Deficiency
Current Article 9 does not specifically address the effect of
failure to comply with the foreclosure rules of Article 9 on the ability
of the secured party to recover a deficiency judgment. However,
because Current section 9-507 provides that the debtor can recover
any damages caused by the failure to comply with the foreclosure
requirements, a logical conclusion is that the secured creditor can
recover a deficiency based on the difference between the price
received on the sale and the debt unless the debtor proves that a sale
conducted in accordance with the requirements of Article 9 would
have produced a higher price. That is, the debtor must prove damages
caused by the failure to comply. 31 If the debtor makes that showing,
then the deficiency recovery would be based on the amount that
would have been received had the creditor complied with the
statutory requirements. However, only a minority of courts have
reached that result. 31 Most courts have applied a "rebuttable
presumption" rule under which the court presumes that a sale
29. See supra note 1.
30. Revised section 9-628(e) reads: "A secured party is not liable under Section 9-625(c)(2)
more than once with respect to any one secured transaction."
31. Of course, damages might include other injuries such as that caused by loss of the right
to redeem if the secured party fails to give notice of the foreclosure sale.
32. See CLARK, supra note 28, 4.12[5][c], at 4-223 n.774 (listing only Alabama, Arizona,
and Oklahoma as requiring debtor to prove the amount of harm caused by the failure to comply
with the Article 9 foreclosure requirements).
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conducted in accordance with Article 9 would have brought enough
to pay the debt in full.33 Therefore, the creditor loses its ability to
recover a deficiency unless it proves that a properly conducted sale
would have satisfied less than the full debt. A third position adopted
by some courts is the "absolute bar" rule: a creditor who fails to

comply with the Article 9 foreclosure rules cannot recover a
deficiency at all. 34
The drafters of Revised Article 9 concluded that the present
majority rule, rebuttable presumption, rather than either of the other
two rules, should be adopted in Revised Article 9.35 However, even

though courts had not distinguished between consumer transactions
and commercial transactions in determining which of the three rules
they would apply,3 6 consumer advocates argued that the absolute bar
rule should be adopted in consumer transactions. They argued that,
even though the rebuttable presumption rule puts the burden on the
secured creditor to prove that the value of the collateral is less than
the debt, the usual consumer debtor is not equipped to effectively

counter evidence offered by the creditor. The drafters, however, were
unwilling to adopt the absolute bar rule for consumer transactions.
The compromise reached in the drafting process was to limit the

statutory application of the rebuttable presumption rule to nonconsumer transactions.37 The statute states no rule for consumer

33. See id. T 4.12[5][b], at 4-220 n.764 (stating that 28 states clearly follow the rebuttable
presumption rule).
34. See id. T 4.12[5][a], at 4-217 n.760 (listing nine jurisdictions that apply the absolute bar
rule: Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Texas, Vermont,
and Wyoming). Clark also notes that intermediate appellate courts in Michigan apply the
absolute bar rule and that the intermediate appellate courts in Missouri and Virginia are split on
whether to do so. See id.
35. Revised section 9-626(a)(3)-(4) reads:
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-628, if a secured party fails to prove
that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in
accordance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement,
disposition, or acceptance, the liability of a debtor or a secondary obligor for a
deficiency is limited to an amount by which the sum of the secured obligation,
expenses, and attorney's fees exceeds the greater of:
(A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance; or
(B) the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the noncomplying
secured party proceeded in accordance with the provisions of this part
relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.
(4) For purposes of paragraph (3)(B), the amount of proceeds that would have been
realized is equal to the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's
fees unless the secured party proves that the amount is less than that sum.
36. See CLARK, supra note 28, T 4.12[5][a], at 4-217.
37. See R. § 9-626(b).

1999]

CONSUMER PROVISIONS IN REVISED ARTICLE 9

transactions.3 8
Revised section 9-626(b) provides that the intention of the
drafters is to leave to the courts the determination of the proper rule
in consumer transactions and that the court may not infer from the
limitation of the rebuttable presumption rule to non-consumer
transactions "the nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions
and may continue to apply established approaches." Therefore, courts
are left free to apply any of the three existing rules, or perhaps a
judicially created variation,39 to failures of a creditor to comply with
the Article 9 foreclosure rules in a consumer transaction.
The hope of consumers is that courts that presently apply the
rebuttable presumption rule will continue to do so in consumer
transactions even though Revised Article 9 tells them they should not
do so in commercial transactions. Presumably it is very unlikely that a
court that previously put the burden on the debtor to prove the harm
caused by a failure to comply with the foreclosure rules of Article 9
would continue to apply that rule to consumers under Revised Article
9 while applying the rebuttable presumption rule to commercial
debtors. Therefore, consumer debtors run little risk that the three or
so states that use such a rule will continue to apply it to consumers.
It is difficult to know how courts will react to the separation of
consumer and commercial transactions with respect to deficiency
judgments. Perhaps courts that presently use the absolute bar rule
will continue to apply that rule to consumers and some courts that
now apply the rebuttable presumption rule to all deficiency actions
will shift to an absolute bar rule for consumer transactions in spite of
the fact that the statutory language clearly shows that the drafters are
expressing no preference for an absolute bar rule. On the other hand,
the clear statement of the drafters that the absolute bar rule is being
rejected in commercial transactions might lead present absolute bar
courts to adopt the rebuttable presumption rule for consumer
transactions also. In a word, we will have to wait and see how courts
react to the somewhat unusual compromise reached in the drafting
process.
38. See id. § 9-626. The exclusion is for "consumer transactions." Therefore, the exclusion
applies if the debt is incurred for personal, family, or household purposes, and the collateral,
which may include intangibles, is held primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
39. See Ruden v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 638 A.2d 1225 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)
(holding that the absolute bar rule should apply to failure to give notice of the sale, but that the
rebuttable presumption rule should apply to failure to have a commercially reasonable sale).
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C. Required Notice of Pending ForeclosureSale
1. Current Article 9
Current Article 9 succinctly addresses the duty of a creditor to
give notice to the debtor prior to holding an Article 9 foreclosure
sale:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in
value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market,
reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent to the debtor,
if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale. 4°
This one sentence encompasses both elements of the notice
requirement: the time the notice is sent, and the content of the notice;
both must be "reasonable." There is no specific time of notice
requirement, and there is no requirement regarding the specific
contents of the notice.
2. Form of Notice in Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 specifies a number of matters that must be
disclosed in the notice of sale, all of them intended to make the
debtor better able to understand the situation she finds herself in. The
following information must be disclosed to all debtors, both
commercial and consumer: the name of the debtor and the secured
party; the collateral that is to be sold; the method of intended
disposition; that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid
indebtedness and the charge, if any, for an accounting; and the time
and place of a public (auction) sale or the time after which a private
sale will take place. 41 In addition, a notice to a debtor in a consumergoods transaction must contain: (1) a description of any liability for a
deficiency of the person to whom the notice is sent; (2) a telephone
number from which the amount required to redeem the collateral
may be secured; and (3) a telephone number or mailing address from
which additional information concerning the disposition and the
obligation secured may be obtained.42 Neither the information
required to be given to all debtors nor the additional information
40. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
41. See R. § 9-613(1).
42. See id. § 9-614(1).
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required to be given to debtors in consumer-goods transactions has to
be in any particular phrasing. 43 However, the statute provides "safe

harbor" statutory forms for both commercial and consumer-goods
transactions." The consumer-goods safe harbor form is sufficiently
specific and complex that it will probably be used by all well informed
debtors.

45

Revised Article 9 provides that the notice of sale sent to
commercial debtors is sufficient even though it contains "minor errors
43. See id. §§ 9-613(4), 9-614(2).
44. Revised section 9-613(5) contains the safe harbor form for non-consumer goods
transactions; section 9-614(3) contains the safe harbor form for consumer goods transactions.
45. Revised section 9-614(3) provides:
The following form of notification, when completed, contains sufficient information:
[Name and address of secured party]
[Date]
NOTICE OF OUR PLAN TO SELL PROPERTY
[Name and address of any obligor who is also a debtor]
Subject: [Identification of transaction]
We have your [describe collateral], because you broke promises in our agreement.
[For a public disposition:]
We will sell [describe collateral] at public sale. A sale could include a lease or
license. The sale will be held as follows:
Date:
Time:
Place:
You may attend the sale and bring bidders if you want.
[For a private disposition:]
We will sell [describe collateral] at private sale sometime after [date]. A sale could
include a lease or license.
The money that we get from the sale (after paying our costs) will reduce the
amount you owe. If we get less money than you owe, you [will or will not, as
applicable] still owe us the difference. If we get more money than you owe, you
will get the extra money, unless we must pay it to someone else.
You can get the property back at any time before we sell it by paying us the full
amount you owe (not just the past due payments) including our expenses. To learn
the exact amount you must pay, call us at [telephone number].
If you want us to explain to you in writing how we have figured the amount that
you owe us, you may call us at [telephone number] [or write us at [secured party's
address]] and request a written explanation. [We will charge you $__
for the
explanation if we sent you another written explanation of the amount you owe us
within the last six months.]
If you need more information about the sale call us at [telephone number] [or
write us at [secured party's address]].
We are sending this notice to the following other people who have an interest in
[describe collateral] or who owe money under your agreement:
[Names of all other debtors and obligors, if any].
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that are not seriously misleading." 6 However, there is no similar
provision for notice to consumer-goods debtors. Rather, the statute
provides that (1) the statutory form is sufficient even if additional
information appears at the end of the form; (2) the statutory form is
sufficient even though it contains errors in information not required
by the form, unless the error is misleading with respect to rights
arising under Article 9; and (3) if a notification does not use the
the effect of including
statutory form, other law determines
47
information not required by the statute.
The failure to include a minor-errors protection for the
consumer-goods notice suggests that any error, no matter how slight,
will make the notice inadequate and subject the creditor to
substantial statutory damages recoverable for failure to comply with48
the Article 9 foreclosure rules even in the absence of actual harm.
Whether such a result is justifiable is questionable. Errors might
occur as to any of the required information: the collateral may be
misdescribed (for example, 1999 automobile described as 1998);
debtor's or creditor's address may be misstated; the time of a public
sale may be misstated; or the telephone number of the creditor may
be misstated. If the model year of a repossessed automobile is
misstated in the notice of sale, it is very unlikely than any harm will
be caused by that alone. The debtor will almost certainly know that
there has been a mistake. 49 Similarly, suppose a person preparing the
notice improperly enters the debtor's address as 11 Overlook Circle,
when the correct address is 9 Overlook Circle, but the post office
employee delivers the notice to the correct address. Here, also, there
seems to be no harm at all. Similarly, if the notice spells the debtor's
name as John when it is Johan there would seem to be no damage at
all except possibly to the debtor's sensibility.
No doubt the absence from section 9-614 of the minor-errorsnot-seriously-misleading defense suggests that courts should read the
statutory requirements for the consumer-goods notice more strictly
than they read the statutory requirements for the non-consumergoods notice. Also, there is no statement here, as there is in the
46.
47.
48.
49.
is quite
sale.

R. § 9-613(3)(B).
See id. § 9-614(4)-(6).
See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
If an advertised notice of sale misstates the model year of an automobile being sold, it
likely that a court would conclude that there had not been a commercially reasonable
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sections dealing with the absolute bar rule50 or the purchase money
rules51 that by silence Article 9 intends neutrality on the issue whether
a minor-errors-not-seriously-misleading defense is available for errors
in the consumer-goods notice. However, neither of those
considerations need lead courts to the conclusion that every error, no
matter how trivial, leads to liability. Surely there must be some de
minimus standard below which there is no violation even though a
technical error has occurred.
The application of a de minimus standard would still leave room
for a difference in result for failures in a non-consumer goods notice
and failures in a consumer-goods notice. Suppose, for example, that a
notice of sale states that an auction will be held at 2 p.m. but
advertised notices state that the sale will be held at 3 p.m. and it is
actually held at 3 p.m. In a commercial context, a court could
conclude that the error in the notice as to time of sale was minor and
not seriously misleading unless the debtor shows some actual
prejudice from the mistaken notice. In the consumer-goods context,
however, a court might conclude that the notice was inadequate
without imposing any duty on the consumer debtor to prove harm
because it is conceivable that harm might result, if, for example, a
prospective bidder alerted by the debtor arrived at the sale location at
2 p.m. and decided not to stay an hour to be present at 3 p.m. or left
assuming that the sale had been canceled. If so, the consumer could
recover the substantial statutory damages available for violations of
Part 6 by creditors.52
The notice of sale is not required to state the amount of the debt
nor the amount required to redeem.53 Therefore, there is no risk of
incurring the substantial statutory penalties because of mistakes in
the amount of the debt or the amount required to redeem. However,
if a creditor voluntarily states the dollar amount of the debt or the
amount needed to redeem in the notice the creditor might be subject
to damages for violation of Part 6 if the amount is misstated. The
misstatement might be an error "misleading with respect to rights4
under this article," which would make the notice insufficient,
presumably thereby triggering statutory damages. Therefore,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
See infra text following note 142.
See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
See form set out in supra note 45.
See R. § 9-614(5).
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creditors would be ill advised to include any dollar amounts in the
notice of pending sale.
As noted above, the statute provides that the statutory notice in
consumer-goods transactions is sufficient even if additional
information appears at the end of the form. Does the existence of that
provision create an inference that if the additional information
appears at the beginning of the form, or interspersed with the
required information, the notification is not sufficient? An argument
can be made that the statute is merely silent concerning whether
additional information at any place other than the end affects the
sufficiency of the form and that the issue must be determined by a
court case to case. On the other hand, presumably the protection for
additional information only if it is at the end of the form is based on
the belief that the statutorily required information ought to appear
first, not obscured by other information. That line of reasoning
suggests that additional information at any place other than the end
of the form would make the form insufficient. In any event, any wellinformed creditor which uses the statutory form will put additional
information only at the end of the form.
Revised section 9-614(6) provides that if the consumer-goods
notice of sale is not in the statutory form, "law other than this article
determines the effect of including information not required [by this
section]." The intent of this provision is not clear. It is unlikely that
there is "other law" that in any direct sense covers the issue. Perhaps
the reference is to more general rules like estoppel,
misrepresentation, or fraud, which conceivably might have
application to some situations. If so, however, it seems that a creditor
might be treated more leniently with respect to the location of
additional information if the statutory form is not used than if it is.
Even if the statutory language merely intends to say that the court
can determine whether the location of additional information in a
notice not in the statutory format makes the notice insufficient, the
result is still likely to be more lenient treatment of variations in the
location of additional information than if the statutory form is used.
But, if use of the statutory form becomes standard, the issue will
seldom arise.
3. Time of Notice in Revised Article 9
As noted above, Current Article 9 requires that reasonable
notice of the pending foreclosure sale be given. Secured creditors
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wishing to remove some of the uncertainty as to whether the statutory
requirements for foreclosure are being complied with, asked for a
bright-line rule for time of notice. Presently, many security
agreements provide that a notice sent ten days before a sale is
sufficient, and courts have sustained those provisions. 5 Therefore, the
drafters of Revised Article 9 proposed that the statute state that a
notice given ten days before the time of disposition is "reasonable."
However, consumer representatives believed that sometimes ten
days would be too short a notice in consumer transactions. At one
point, consumer representatives argued for a twenty-one-day notice
requirement. However, the drafters rejected that proposal because
there are significant costs to forced delays in foreclosure. Each day
the sale is delayed is a day when interest is lost on sale proceeds and a
day in which costs of holding the goods are being incurred. Therefore,
the drafters believed that a forced twenty-one-day delay in sale would
harm many consumers by increasing the costs of the sale and the size
of a deficiency.
The drafters, however, acceded to the consumer position to some
extent. Under the revision, in other than consumer transactions, a
notice sent ten days before the earliest time of disposition set forth in
the notice "is sent within a reasonable time. '5 6 But in consumer
transactions, whether a notice is sent within a reasonable time is a
question of fact, and no safe-harbor time is stated in the statute. The
failure of the statute to give approval to a ten-day notice in consumer
transactions might lead courts to find that a contracted for ten-day
period is manifestly unreasonable and not effective to fix time of
notice:58 at least the failure to give statutory approval to a ten-day
notice invites such an argument on behalf of a consumer debtor. Also,
it should be noted that there is no provision here, as there is
elsewhere in the statute, that courts should not draw any inferences as
55. See Aetna Fin. Co. v. Culpepper, 320 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (approving a
security agreement provision fixing a ten-day notice); CLARK, supra note 28, 4.08[7][c], 4-138
(asserting that no court has invalidated a ten-day notice provision). Current section 9-501(3)
permits parties to fix standards for the performance of their obligations including the obligation
to give reasonable notice, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Revised section
9-603(a) continues the right to fix standards if they are not manifestly unreasonable.
56. R. § 9-612(b).
57. See id. § 9-612(a). The exclusion from the ten-day safe harbor is for consumer
transactions, not just consumer-goods transactions. Therefore, the exclusion is broader than the
additional notice provisions of Revised section 9-614 that apply only to consumer-goods
transactions.
58. See id. § 9-612(b).
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to the proper rule in consumer transactions from the limitation of the
ten-day safe-harbor provision to commercial transactions. Therefore,
it may be risky for the creditor to contract for, or to give, only a tenday notice of sale in consumer transactions.
D. Post-Sale Notice in Revised Article 9
Probably most foreclosure sales do not produce a price high
enough to discharge the debt. In those cases, the debtor will still owe
the remainder of the debt (the "deficiency"). At present there is no
requirement that the creditor, when demanding that the debtor pay
the deficiency, give any accounting showing how the deficiency was
calculated. Consumer representatives in the drafting process argued
that creditors sometimes fail to properly rebate unearned finance
charges or refunds of insurance premiums when making a claim for
deficiency. They believed that requiring an accounting to the debtor
after foreclosure would make creditors more careful about giving
rebates and refunds. Also, they argued that a notice showing the price
received at the sale could alert consumers to possible problems with
the sale itself. Creditors, on the other hand, believed that consumers
would not gain enough from an automatic post-sale disclosure to
justify the additional expense to creditors (and thus to borrowers) or
to justify an additional statutory requirement for which there would
be statutory penalties for failure to comply. Creditors noted that
under Current section 9-208 a debtor can demand an accounting 9 and
that they would not object to having to provide post-sale information
on demand. Creditors were also concerned about the practical
problems of being sure that they could comply with a statutory
requirement that a post-sale notice be sent before collection efforts to
recover a deficiency begin.
The drafters decided to include a post-sale notice requirement
for consumer-goods transactions but, in a concession to creditor
concerns, provided only minimum penalties for creditor failures
regarding the notice. 6° The notice is required if the consumer-goods
debtor is entitled to a surplus or is liable for a deficiency. 61 The notice
59. Current section 9-208 does not fit the post-sale case well. It requires that the debtor
sign a statement indicating the amount the debtor believes is due and send it to the creditor. The
creditor then has an obligation to approve or correct the statement. In the post-sale case, the
debtor would have little basis on which to state an amount due.
60. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
61. See R. § 9-616(b).
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must be sent: (1) before or at the time the creditor pays over any
surplus or makes written demand for payment of the deficiency or (2)
within fourteen days after receiving a request for the notice from the
62
debtor or consumer obligor.

Consumer representatives asserted that there is some practice,
particularly in automobile finance, of the creditor always bidding in at
the amount of the debt and expenses and then reselling the car. In

that case, a notice might alert a debtor that the collateral had been
bought by the creditor at a such a low price that it suggests that the
sale was not commercially reasonable. However, the statute does not
require an accounting if there is neither a deficiency nor a surplus;
there is not even a right to request an accounting.63 Also, there is no
obligation to give the notice if the creditor waives the right to a

deficiency in a record. 64
The post-sale notice must state the aggregate debt secured by the
security interest, the price received at the sale, and must disclose
rebates or credits by type and the various expenses of repossession
and sale by type, though in both cases, the dollar amount can be
broken down by type of credit or expense or aggregated as a single
65
amount.
62.
63.
64.
65.
(c)

See id.
See id.
See id.
Revised section 9-616(c) reads:
[The post-sale notice] must provide the following information in the following
order:
(1) the aggregate amount of obligations secured by the security interest under
which the disposition was made, and, if the amount reflects a rebate of
unearned interest or credit service charge, an indication of that fact,
calculated as of a specified date:
(A) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral after
default, not more than 35 days before the secured party takes or receives
possession; or
(B) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral before
default or does not take possession of the collateral, not more than 35
days before disposition;
(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition;
(3) the aggregate amount of the obligations after deducting the amount of
proceeds;
(4) the amount, in the aggregate, or by type, and types of expenses, including
expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and
disposing of the collateral, and attorney's fees secured by the collateral which
are known to the secured party and relate to the current disposition;
(5) the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of credits, including
rebates of interest or credit service charges, to which the obligor is known to
be entitled and which are not reflected in the amount in paragraph (1); and
(6) the amount of the surplus or deficiency.
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The burden on creditors imposed by the requirement is lessened
by two things. First, an explanation that substantially complies with
the statutory requirements is sufficient even though it contains minor
errors if those errors are not seriously misleading. 66 Second, a secured
party who fails to give a proper notice is not liable for statutory
damages of the finance charge plus ten percent of the principal, which
is applicable to most failures to comply with Part 6. Rather, statutory
damages are limited to $500 and those damages are recoverable only
if the secured party fails to give the notice after a demand has been
made or if the failure is "part of a pattern, or consistent with a
practice, of noncompliance. ' 67 Presumably, the "consistent with a
practice" provision is intended to reduce the burden of proof imposed
on the consumer who did not make a demand but claims the $500
damages. Even though the consumer can only show what happened in
the particular case, a finder of fact might decide that the conduct in
that case was "consistent with a practice" of not sending the required
notices.
The debtor or consumer obligor can also recover any actual
damages suffered in addition to the $500 statutory damages. 68 In order
to recover actual damages, the consumer needs merely to show that
Revised section 9-616 was not complied with; he does not have to
show that he made a demand for the notice or that the failure to
comply with the statute was consistent with a practice of failure to
comply. 69 However, it is not easy to visualize what actual damages
might arise from failure to send the notice in addition to damages that
may arise from failure to have a commercially reasonable sale.
E. ForeclosureSales to Related Partiesor PartiesLiable to the Secured
Party Under a Guaranteeor Repurchase Agreement
1. Current Article 9-Purchase at Foreclosure Sale by Secured Party
Under Current Article 9, a secured party cannot buy the

66. See R. § 9-616(d).
67. Id. § 9-625(e).
68. See id. Revised section 9-625(c)(2) read literally would also give statutory damages of
the finance charge plus 10% of the principal debt for a failure to give the post-default notice as
required by section 9-616 because it awards those damages for any failure to "comply with this
part." However, section 9-628(d) provides that a secured party is not liable to any party under
section 9-625(c)(2) for failure to comply with section 9-616.
69. See id. § 9-625(b).
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collateral at a private sale, but may do so at a public sale.70 The reason
for the restriction is that if the secured party could buy at a private
sale, it could sell to itself at below a fair foreclosure price, seek a
deficiency based on the low price, and then resell the collateral for a
profit. If the private sale is to a third party, the secured party has no
incentive to sell at below a fair price because any excess in value of
the collateral above the foreclosure sale price goes to the third party
rather than to the secured party. In the public sale case, it is assumed
that the presence of third-party bidders at the sale will prevent the
secured party from being able to buy the collateral for less than fair
foreclosure value.
2. Current Article 9-Purchase at Foreclosure Sale by Related Party
If the sale is at auction, parties related to the secured party, such
as a parent or subsidiary corporation, should be able to buy just as the
creditor itself can buy. If, however, the sale is a private sale, a creditor
may have an incentive to sell to a related party at a low price and let
the related party capture the excess value in the same way that the
creditor could capture the excess value in a sale to itself. In spite of
the lack of incentive to sell at the best possible price, Current Article
9 does not prohibit private sales to related parties. However, a court
might find that a sale to a related party is in fact a sale to the secured
party itself and, therefore, a violation of Article 9 if the sale is a
private sale. A Georgia court did so hold in 1974.71
3. Current Law-Purchase at Foreclosure Sale by Recourse Party
Many sellers who sell on credit, taking a security interest in the
item sold, then assign the security interest and debt to a finance
company or bank. It is common for such an assignment transaction to
include a recourse agreement under which, upon the debtor's default,
the seller (recourse party) will buy back the security interest at the
amount of the debt still owed. If the seller buys back the security
interest, it will then hold an Article 9 foreclosure sale to realize on the
collateral. Other recourse parties, such as co-makers on secured
70. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3). The secured party may buy at a private sale "if the collateral is
of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely
distributed standard price quotations." Id.
71. See Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Furniture Warehouse Sales, Inc. 209 S.E.2d 63 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1974) (private sale to corporation owned by creditor's wife and managed by creditor
violated the prohibition against private sales to the creditor).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1255

notes, or guarantors of debtors, on default of the debtor, whether or
not obligated to do so, may pay off the debt and take an assignment
of the creditor's rights under the security agreement.
However, sometimes rather than assigning the security interest to
the recourse party, the holder of the security interest will conduct an
Article 9 sale at which the recourse party may buy. That sale might
either be an auction sale or a private sale. Because the secured party
can buy at its own auction sale, the recourse party should also be able
to buy at such a sale. On the other hand, because the secured party
cannot buy at its own private sale, there is reason to deny a recourse
party the right to buy at such a sale.
If the secured party has a recourse agreement with a third party
under which the third party is liable for any deficiency, the creditor
does not have an incentive to get the best price. Therefore, the
secured party may allow the recourse party to "buy" the collateral at
a low price because the price received by the secured party is
meaningless to it. It will be paid the full debt by the recourse party in
any event. The only economic effect of the sale to the recourse party
is to fix the amount of the deficiency, which, if collected, will inure to
72
the benefit of the recourse party.
In that context, the meaning of Current section 9-504(5) is
unclear. That section reads:
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty,
indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a
transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to his
rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. Such
a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral
under this Article.
Does section 9-504(5) merely record the obvious fact that a
security interest can be assigned to a recourse party, or does it go
72. A mathematical example may help. Suppose creditor, who has a full recourse
agreement with a dealer, repossesses an automobile when the unpaid debt is $10,000. Dealer
will be obligated to pay creditor any deficiency after the automobile is sold, but dealer will be
able also to assert a deficiency claim against the buyer of the automobile as assignee of, or by
subrogation to, the rights of the secured party. The reasonable foreclosure value of the
automobile is $7,000. In a private sale, dealer buys the automobile for $5,000. He pays the
creditor another $5,000 (the deficiency) for a total of $10,000. Dealer then asserts a deficiency
claim against the buyer for $5,000. If dealer had bid fair closure value, $7,000, he would have
paid the deficiency of $3,000. But, if he had bid fair foreclosure value, he would have only has a
$3000 deficiency claim against the buyer. As the example shows, the only effect of the
foreclosure price when the sale is to a recourse party is to fix the deficiency owed from the
debtor. The price has no effect on the recourse party's liability, which is always to pay the full
debt.
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further and say that a purported sale to a recourse party is not an
effective foreclosure sale? It is certainly true that any foreclosure sale
involves a "transfer of the collateral"; therefore, the purpose of
9-504(5) may be to turn any purported sale into merely an assignment
to the recourse party who must then conduct a sale. However,
nothing in the comments suggests that result and some commentators
have thought that the section refers only to cases in which the
recourse party takes back the security interest intending then to hold
a foreclosure sale.,' The courts have been divided, but a substantial
number have held that the section denies effectiveness to a purported
foreclosure sale if the sale is to a recourse party.74 There are cases,
however, holding that section 9-504(5) does not prohibit foreclosure
sales to related parties.
If a purported sale to a recourse party is not an effective
foreclosure sale, a number of consequences follow: (1) the price
received at the sale cannot be used to measure a deficiency,76 (2) the
recourse party must now hold a foreclosure sale, and a subsequent
sale by the recourse party will fix the deficiency,77 (3) any defects in
the first sale or in notice of that sale will be irrelevant because that
was not an Article 9 sale,7 8 and (4) the recourse party is required to
comply with the Article 9 notice and sale requirements when it
disposes of the collateral.7 9
4. Treatment of Sales to Related Parties and Recourse Parties in
Revised Article 9
Consumer representatives in the drafting process argued that
Current section 9-504(5) should be read to deny foreclosure sale
status to any sale, either private or at auction, to a recourse party and
that such an interpretation of the provision should be made explicit in
Revised Article 9. Therefore, in all sales to recourse parties, the
recourse party would be required to conduct an Article 9 foreclosure
sale by which any deficiency would be measured.
73. See Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase (Of Collateral?)Agreements and the Larger Issue of
Deficiency Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649 (1992-1993).
74. See CLARK, supra note 28, 4.08[8][c], at 4-168.
75. See, e.g., Shields v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 261 S.E.2d 238 (N.C. Ct. App.), affd
by an equally divided court, 266 S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 1980).
76. See generally Reeves v. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co., 247 N.W.2d 434 (Neb. 1976).
77. See generally id.
78. See Stoppi v. Wilmington Trust Co., 518 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. 1986).
79. See Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969).
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The drafters, however, rejected a prohibition of sales to related
parties or to recourse parties. Revised section 9-610(c) continues the
present prohibition on a secured party's buying at his own private
sale, but there is no restriction on purchases by recourse parties or
related parties. Current section 9-504(5), which, as noted above, many
courts construed as prohibiting foreclosure sales to recourse parties, is
rephrased in Revised section 9-618 to make clear that foreclosure sale
purchases by recourse parties are not covered by the section. 0
Comment 3 to Revised section 9-618 notes that a recourse party may
buy at the secured party's foreclosure sale. The comment also says
that the contrary reading of Current section 9-504(5) is
"unreasonable" because the secured party itself can buy at a public
sale, and there is no reason for giving lesser rights to a recourse
party. 81 (The comment neglects to say that because the secured party
cannot buy at its own private sale, there is no reason to give a
recourse party greater rights.)
Instead of a prohibition on sales to related or recourse parties,
Revised Article 9 subjects such sales to a special scrutiny, which, like
"strict scrutiny" in constitutional law jurisprudence, may be difficult
to apply to specific cases. 82 Revised section 9-615(f) reads:
The surplus or deficiency following a disposition is calculated based
on the amount of proceeds that would have been realized in a
disposition complying with this part to a transferee other than the
secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary
obligor, if:
(1) the transferee in the disposition is the secured party, a person
related to the secured party, 83 or a secondary obligor;84 and

80. Revised section 9-618 reads (emphasis added):
(a) A secondary obligor acquires the rights and becomes obligated to perform the
duties of the secured party after the secondary obligor:
(1) receives an assignment of a secured obligation from the secured party;
(2) receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party and agrees to accept the
rights and assume the duties of the secured party; or
(3) is subrogated to the rights of a secured party with respect to collateral.
Subsection (b) states that transactions described in subsection (a) are not foreclosure sales but
do relieve the secured party of further duties under Article 9. See R. § 9-618(b).
81. See id. § 9-618 cmt. 3.
82. See, for example, the discussion in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451-54 (2d. ed. 1988).
83. Revised section 9-102(62) and (63) define related parties:
(62) "Person related to," with respect to an individual, means:
(A) the spouse of the individual;
(B) a brother, brother-in-law, sister, or sister-in-law of the individual;
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(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly
below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a
person other than the secured party, a person related to the
secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.
The section's specific treatment of low price sales to related
parties seems to so undercut holdings under Current Article 9 that a
court may find that a private sale to a related party is, in effect, a sale
to the secured party itself and is not a proper sale (Revised Article 9
continues to prohibit purchase at a private sale by the secured party
itself). 85 However, the section also applies to a purchase by the
secured creditor itself at auction sale, at which it can buy. Therefore,
if the secured party advertises an auction sale and bids in itself, it will
be subject to a claim that the price paid was significantly below the
range of prices which an unrelated bidder would have paid. The risk
of an adverse finding on that issue is not great if other bidders were
present, but if the advertised auction is not attended by other bidders
and the secured party buys in, there is a risk of an adverse finding.
While the new provision injects an additional element of risk to
purchases by the secured party, a related party, or a recourse pariy, it
also rejects the idea that an unjustifiably low price in a sale to any of
those parties is necessarily a commercially unreasonable sale
subjecting the secured party to the statutory damages that are

(C) an ancestor or lineal descendant of the individual or the individual's spouse;
or
(D) any other relative, by blood or marriage, of the individual or the individual's
spouse who shares the same home with the individual.
(63) "Person related to," with respect to an organization, means:
(A) a person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with the organization;
(B) an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect
to, the organization;
(C) an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect
to, a person described in subparagraph (A);
(D) the spouse of an individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); or
(E) an individual who is related by blood or marriage to an individual described
in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), or (D) and shares the same home with the
individual.
84. "Secondary obligor" means an obligor to the extent that:
(A) the obligor's obligation is secondary; or
(B) the obligor has a right of recourse with respect to an obligation secured by
collateral against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.
R. § 9-102(71). Recourse parties, co-makers and other guarantors fit within this definition.
Revised section 9-618, which replaces Current section 9-504(5), refers to "secondary obligors"
rather than describing types of secondary obligors.
85. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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imposed in favor of consumer debtors. 86 However, as is the case
generally, a low price may suggest that the other aspects of the sale
should be carefully examined to determine whether the sale was
87
commercially reasonable.
Presumably, in a case in which Revised section 9-615(f) comes
into issue, the debtor will allege that the sale was not commercially
reasonable and, further, that even if it was commercially reasonable,
the price received was significantly below the range of prices that a
sale to a nonrelated party would have brought. In a nonconsumer
case, the debtor's remedy will be essentially the same if either of the
debtor's contentions is found to be true. In either case, the deficiency
or surplus will be determined by the price that would have been
received in a hypothetical sale: either a sale conducted in accordance
with the Article 9 requirements if the sale was not commercially
reasonable, 88 or a sale complying with the Article 9 requirements to a
disinterested third party, if the sale was commercially reasonable but
produced a price significantly below what a sale to a disinterested
third party would have brought. 89 However, in a transaction in which
the collateral is consumer goods, the secured party will not be liable
for statutory damages based merely on the fact that the price received
was significantly below the price that would have been received in a
sale to an unrelated party, but will be liable for the statutory damages
if the court finds that the sale was not commercially reasonable.
Therefore, in a transaction secured by consumer goods, the debtor
will have an incentive to show not merely that the sale to a related
party was below the reasonable range of prices that a sale to a
nonrelated party would have produced, but also that the sale was not
commercially reasonable. That incentive may be encouraged by the
burden of proof rules, which are discussed next.
F. Burden of Proof When a Deficiency Is Sought
Revised section 9-626(a) deals with burden of proof issues when
a deficiency is sought or the debtor claims that a surplus is too low
and with the amount of debtor's damages if the Article 9 foreclosure

86. See R. § 9-615 cmt. 6.
87. "[A] low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a
disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable." See id. § 9-627 cmt. 2.
88. See id. § 9-626(a)(3).
89. See id. § 9-615(f).
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rules have not been complied with.9° Those rules, however, apply only
to nonconsumer transactions. Under those rules, the secured party
must prove compliance with the Article 9 foreclosure rules if the
debtor raises the issue.91 If the sale was to a person described in
Revised section 9-615(f) 92 and the debtor claims that the price was too
low under that section, the debtor must prove that the price received
was significantly below the range of prices that would have been
received on a sale to a disinterested third party. 93 If that is proven, the
statute does not address the issue of who has the burden of proving
the amount that would have been received on a complying sale to a
disinterested party. 94 Perhaps the assumption is that the deficiency or
surplus should be calculated based on the lowest price within the
"range of prices" that a disposition to a disinterested party would
have brought. As noted above, the likely scenario is that the debtor
will allege that the sale was commercially unreasonable and, if the
sale was to a person described in section 9-615(f), that, in any event,
the price received was significantly below the range of prices that
would have been received from an unrelated party. In such a case, the
creditor has the burden of proof on the first issue and the debtor has
the burden as to the second issue.
As noted above, the burden of proof rules just discussed do not
apply to consumer transactions. The statute states that the limitation
of the rules of the section to nonconsumer transactions "is intended
to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in
consumer transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation
the nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions and may
continue to apply established approaches." 95 The primary purpose of
the language just quoted is to leave to the courts the issue of whether
the "rebuttable presumption rule" or the "absolute bar rule" should
apply to consumer transactions. However, the exclusion of consumer
transactions from the rules of the section also has the effect of
excluding those transactions from the rule that the secured party has
the burden of proving that a commercially reasonable sale was held

90.
secured
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text (regarding damages for failure of the
creditor to comply with the Article 9 foreclosure rules).
See R. § 9-626(a)(1), (2).
Under this section, a person is the secured party, a related party, or a recourse party.
See R. § 9-626(a)(5).
See id. §§ 9-615(f), 9-626.
Id. § 9-626(b).
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and from the rule that the debtor has the burden of proving that a
sale to the secured party, a related party, or a recourse party, was
significantly below the range of prices that would have been received
from an unrelated party.
It is unlikely that a court would place a higher burden on a
consumer debtor than the statute imposes on a commercial debtor.
Therefore, where this section places the burden on the secured party,
a court will almost certainly place it there in a consumer transaction.
However, the section places the burden on a commercial debtor to
prove that the price on a foreclosure sale to the secured party, a
related party, or a recourse party was significantly below the range of
prices that would have been received on a sale to an unrelated party.
It is quite possible that courts will place the burden as to that issue on
the secured party in a consumer transaction. Placing the burden on
the secured party would be reasonable because it is much more likely
to know, or have access to the relevant facts, than a consumer debtor.
If so, secured parties need to be prepared to address that issue in
consumer transactions if the sale is to the secured party, a related
party, or recourse party. If the court places the burden on the secured
party, the issue is likely to be raised by the consumer debtor in every
litigated case involving a sale to a related or recourse party.9 6
G. Consumer Debtor Waiver of Rights Under Part6
Generally, debtors, including consumer debtors, cannot waive
the provisions in either Current or Revised Article 9 that require the
secured creditor to proceed in a certain manner on debtor's default.
However, under Current Article 9, a debtor can waive the right to
notification of the time of sale by "signing after default a statement
renouncing or modifying" the right to notice 97 and can waive the right
to redeem by agreement "in writing after default." 98 Also, under
Current Article 9, a debtor can waive the requirement of section
9-505(1), which requires sale within ninety days after taking
96. Comment 5 to Revised section 9-626 reads:
In a non-consumer transaction, subsection(a)(5) imposes upon a debtor or obligor the
burden of proving that the proceeds of a disposition are so low that, under Section
9-615(f), the actual proceeds should not serve as the basis upon which a deficiency or
surplus is calculated. Were the burden placed on the secured party, then debtors might
be encouraged to challenge the price received in every disposition to the secured party,
a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.
97. U.C.C. § 9-504(5).
9& Id. § 9-506.
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possession of the collateral if a consumer has paid sixty percent of the
obligation,99 by signing "after default a statement renouncing or

modifying his rights under this Part."' 1°

Under Revised Article 9, a consumer debtor cannot waive the
right to redeem in a consumer-goods transactiono1 but can waive the
right if the collateral is consumer intangibles: 2 Revised Article 9
continues to permit consumer debtors to waive the right to
notification of the time of planned disposition of collateral. 103 It also
permits a debtor to waive the right to require sale within ninety days
after repossession if sixty percent of the debt has been paid if the
collateral is consumer goods. °4 In all three cases in which a consumer
debtor may waive rights under Revised Article 9, the waiver must be
by "an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after
default."105 Current Article 9 allows waiver of notification and of the
right to require sale within ninety days by signing a "statement" after
default.' ° However, waiver of the right to redeem requires that the
07
debtor agree "in writing after default."'
The requirement of Revised section 9-624 that a waiver be by
"an agreement [emphasis added] to that effect entered into and
authenticated after default" is intended to direct the court's attention
to the fact that papers signed by a debtor after default may contain
"waivers" to which the debtor has not actually "agreed." The idea is
that the creditor trying to claim protection for its conduct, based upon
99. See id. The obligation arises if the debtor has paid 60% of the cash price in a credit sale
or 60% of the loan if the transaction was a loan. See id. § 9-506(1).
100. Id. § 9-505(1).
101. Revised section 9-602 says that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 9-624,... the
debtor or obligor may not waive or vary the rules stated in ... (11) Section 9-623, which deals
with redemption of collateral." Section 9-624(c) reads: "Except in a consumer-goods
transaction, a debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to redeem collateral under
Section 9-623 only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default."
Section 9-624(c) looked at alone could be read as allowing waiver in consumer transactions
without any restriction. However, it must be read together with section 9-602 which says that
except as provided in section 9-624 the right of redemption cannot be waived. Because section
9-624(c) does not apply to consumer goods transactions, the non-waiver rules are left in place.
102. See R. § 9-624(c).
103. See id. § 9-624(a).
104. The provision requiring disposition is in Revised section 9-620(e). That section
continues the rules of Current section 9-506. Revised section 9-624(b) states the waiver rule. In
addition to section 9-624(b), section 9-620(f) allows the creditor to delay foreclosure beyond 90
days to "any longer period to which the debtor and all secondary parties have agreed in an
agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default."
105. R. § 9-624.
106. See U.C.C. §§ 9-504(5), 9-505(1).
107. Id. § 9-506.
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a waiver by the debtor, must show agreement by the debtor in the
same sense that a party claiming under a contract has to prove that
the other party has entered into the agreement. Consumer
representatives in the drafting process suggested that often on
repossession the debtor is asked to sign a number of papers or a
single paper with many provisions that may include a waiver.
Sometimes the debtor will sign not being aware that by signing she is
waiving rights. The use of the word "agreement" in the Revised
sections may somewhat more clearly address that problem than does
the reference to signed "statements" in Current Article 9. As
Comment 5 to Revised section 9-602 says:
Under Section 1-201, an "'agreement' means the bargain of the
parties in fact." In considering waivers under Section 9-624 and
analogous agreements in other contexts, courts should carefully
scrutinize putative agreements that appear in records that also
address many additional or unrelated matters.
H. PartialStrict Foreclosure
"Strict foreclosure" is the name given to an agreement between
the secured party and the debtor that the secured party will accept the
collateral in full satisfaction of the debt, thereby avoiding the
necessity of a foreclosure sale. Partial strict foreclosure is an
agreement that the secured party may forego foreclosure and take the
collateral in partial satisfaction of the debt, with the debtor remaining
liable for the remainder. Current section 9-505(2), which deals with
strict foreclosure, does not specifically refer to taking the collateral in
partial satisfaction of the debt, but courts have held that such an
agreement is permissible as a modification of the debtor's rights that
is permitted by Current section 9-505.108
Revised section 9-620, which deals with strict foreclosure,
however, prohibits partial strict foreclosure in consumer transactions.
The reason for the prohibition is the fear that consumers, particularly
in automobile transactions, will not be good judges of value of the
collateral and, therefore, can be taken advantage of by creditors. The
restriction, however, is not limited to consumer goods transactions.
Therefore, if the collateral is consumer investment property and the
transaction is for personal, family, or household purposes, the secured
108. See S. M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genesee Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 73, 76 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979).

1999]

CONSUMER PROVISIONS IN REVISED ARTICLE 9

creditor could not propose to take the collateral in partial satisfaction
of the debt. That seems somewhat perverse if the investment property
has a clear market value as would be the case for most investment
property. However, the inefficiency of requiring a sale in such a case
is not great because the secured party can buy at its own private
sale. 1°9 Therefore, the only inconvenience is having to give notice of
the pending sale and being certain to buy in at the market price. But
notice of sale can be waived in essentially the same way that consent
to a partial strict foreclosure could be agreed to,110 so the end result is
that standard price securities can be purchased by the secured party
in a transaction which is indistinguishable in result from partial strict
foreclosure.
However, a secured creditor in a consumer (or nonconsumer)
transaction could propose to take investment property in full
satisfaction of the debt, and under the statute, it is not necessary that
the debtor indicate agreement by signing a record. Rather, the
creditor can send the debtor a proposal to keep the collateral in
satisfaction of the debt and, if the secured party does not receive
notification of objection "authenticated by the debtor within 20 days
after the proposal is sent," the secured party may keep the collateral
in satisfaction of the debt. 1 That scheme presents obvious
possibilities for overreaching by the creditor in consumer (and nonconsumer) transactions. However, the good faith requirement of
Current section 1-203112 should prevent a creditor from effectively
taking securities worth more than the debt without any obligation to
account for the surplus." 3 Also, a bad faith attempt to take collateral
109. Under Revised section 9-610 (as under Current section 9-504) the secured party can
buy at its own private foreclosure sale if the "collateral is of a kind that is customarily sold on a
recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations." A sale to the
secured party, or anyone else, at a price different than what would be received on the
"recognized market" or at the standard price quotations would, no doubt, be commercially
unreasonable.
110. See supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing waiver of notice of the sale). Revised
section 9-620(c)(1), which permits partial strict foreclosure in commercial transactions, requires
that the debtor "agree to the terms of the [partial strict foreclosure] in a record authenticated
after default."
111. See R. § 9-620(c)(2).
112. Section 1-203 reads: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement."
113. Comment 11 to Revised section 9-620 states that the good faith obligation in the Code
would apply to proposals to take collateral in satisfaction of the debt and then says: "For
example, a secured party's proposal to accept marketable securities worth $1,000 in full
satisfaction of indebtedness in the amount of $100, made in the hopes that the debtor might
inadvertently fail to object, would be made in bad faith."
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of a value clearly in excess of the debt in satisfaction of the debt
would probably be a violation of the creditor's duties under Part 6
and would, therefore, subject the creditor to the statutory damages
114
imposed by Part 6 for such violations in consumer transactions.
L Protectionfor Creditor Who Relies on Debtor Representation That
the Transaction Is Not a Consumer Transaction
Revised section 9-628(c) provides a slight bit of solace for
secured creditors who face additional requirements and restrictions in
dealing with consumer debtors under Revised Article 9. That section
reads:
A secured party is not liable to any person, and a person's liability
for a deficiency is not affected, because of any act or omission
arising out of the secured party's reasonable belief that a
transaction is not a consumer-goods transaction or a consumer
transaction or that goods are not consumer goods, if the secured
party's belief is based on its reasonable reliance on:
(1) a debtor's representation concerning the purpose for which
collateral was to be used, acquired, or held; or
(2) an obligor's representation concerning the purpose for which
a secured obligation was incurred.
That subsection will give some protection to creditors, primarily with
respect to the foreclosure rules just discussed.
Under the quoted section, any of the representations referred to
would prevent the transaction from being subject to the consumer
rules just referred to."' Therefore, the secured party would avoid
liability for statutory damages for violation of these requirements and
probably also liability for any actual damages that the consumer
debtor claimed as a result of such violations.
It is not clear whether the subsection will apply to nonforeclosure
situations in which Article 9 applies a different rule to consumer
transactions than to nonconsumer transactions. Revised Article 9
permits an Article 9 security interest in deposit accounts other than
personal, family, or household accounts. Similarly, Revised Article 9
generally permits the secured party to take an interest in the debtor's
after-acquired property, but limits that right as to consumer goods.
Would reasonable reliance on the debtor's representation concerning

114. See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 12-20.
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the use of a deposit account or of goods permit the secured party to
have an Article 9 security interest in a deposit account or in afteracquired consumer goods? If the subsection does not apply, a creditor
might be liable for conversion if it repossesses after-acquired
consumer goods or if a court determines that on common law
principles it did not have a security interest in a consumer deposit
account even though it reasonably relied on a debtor's representation
as to the character of the collateral or the transaction.
The provision is not limited to acts or omissions in the
foreclosure process; therefore, it may be intended to apply to acts that
in connection with the taking of the security interest would not be
permissible if the transaction were a consumer transaction.
The provision provides protection for "any act or omission
arising out of the secured party's reasonable belief that the
transaction is not" one of the transactions described for which there
are special rules. The obligation to give notice before a foreclosure
sale is held and to hold a commercially reasonable sale does not
depend on whether the transaction is or is not one of the transactions
described. Therefore, a creditor cannot argue that it failed to hold a
commercially reasonable sale or failed to give a notice of sale because
it reasonably relied on the debtor's representation that the
transaction was not a consumer transaction. In such a case, therefore,
it would seem that if the creditor failed to have a commercially
reasonable sale and the transaction was in fact a consumer
transaction, the creditor would be liable for the statutory penalties
imposed for failure to comply with the foreclosure requirements.
Also, if the state has adopted an absolute bar for consumer
transactions, that rule would apply to the transaction even though the
creditor reasonably relied on the debtor's representation that the
transaction was not a consumer transaction.
However, comment 2 to Revised section 9-628 reads:
If a secured party reasonably, but mistakenly, believes that a
consumer transaction or consumer-goods transaction is a nonconsumer transaction or a non-consumer-goods transaction, and if
the secured party's belief is based on its reasonable reliance on a
representation of the type specified in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2),
then this Article should be applied as if the facts reasonably
believed were true. For example, if a secured party reasonably
believed that a transaction was a non-consumer transaction and its
belief was based on reasonable reliance on the debtor's
misrepresentation that the collateral secured an obligation incurred
for business purposes, the rebuttable presumption rule would apply
under 9-626(b).
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The comment seems to ignore the language of the subsection
that refers to acts or omissions based on the reasonable belief. As a
policy matter, there might be some justification for limiting liability
for wrongful conduct to the liability that would attach if the
transaction were as represented by the debtor if the secured party
reasonably relied on that representation. Perhaps a creditor's
willingness to enter into the transaction, or the price at which it enters
it, is to some extent based on assumptions about its liability if it fails
to comply with statutory requirements in the transaction. However, it
is doubtful that the statutory language supports that result.
III. NON-FORECLOSURE ISSUES
A. Status of PurchaseMoney InterestAfter Refinancing or
Consolidation
Both Current and Revised Article 9 accord special status to
"purchase money" security interests. Purchase money security
interests are security interests given in purchased collateral to secure
the debtor's repayment of value given to enable the debtor to acquire
the collateral. 116 Under both versions of Article 9, a purchase money
interest in certain consumer goods is perfected without filing." 7 Also,
both Current and Revised Article 9 allow purchase-money secured
creditors to get priority over earlier filed security interests attaching
to the purchased goods under an after-acquired property clause in the
earlier security agreement.1 8 However, both versions of Article 9
make invalid a security interest attaching to consumer goods as
additional collateral under an after-acquired property clause unless
the debtor acquires the goods within ten days after the creditor gives
value.11 9 However, the invalidity applies only if the after-acquired
goods are given as additional security. If, for example, a creditor lends
a consumer $9,000 and takes a security interest in a boat that the
116. See U.C.C. § 9-107; R. § 9-103(a)-(b). Both sellers who take a security interest in the
sold goods to secure the unpaid portion of their price and lenders who provide funds used by
the buyer to acquire the goods and take a security interest in the goods have purchase money
interests.
117. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (filing is necessary for motor vehicles required to be
registered); R. § 9-309(a)(1) (filing is necessary for goods subject to certificate of title acts).
However, unless the purchase money security interest holder files a financing statement, the
security interest is subordinate to the rights of a consumer purchaser who buys without
knowledge of the security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-307(2); R. § 9-320(b).
118. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4); R. § 9-324.
119. See U.C.C. § 9-204(2); R. § 9-204(b).
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consumer intends to acquire and takes no other collateral, the
security interest would attach to the boat even though it is not
acquired within the ten-day period. Therefore, there is some slight
reason for protecting consumer purchase money interests against
earlier secured parties with an after-acquired property clause.
(However, the Federal Trade Commission has made it an unfair trade
practice for a creditor to take a security interest, other than a
purchase money interest, in certain household goods. 120 )
The Bankruptcy Code also recognizes the special importance of
purchase-money financing for consumers by allowing a purchase
money security interest to survive bankruptcy in situations where a
nonpurchase money interest would be voided. Section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that certain "exempt" property of
individual debtors cannot be reached by the trustee to satisfy
creditors. 121 Exempt property is that which is specified under the
Bankruptcy Code itself or, if states have chosen to opt out of the
bankruptcy exemption system, property which is specified by the state
exemption statutes. 122 The exemption applies to such things as
household goods, furniture, clothes, automobiles, personal jewelry,
and so on. 123 The debtor can, therefore, retain such property after the
bankruptcy proceeding is completed even though creditors remain
unpaid.
The Bankruptcy Code goes further in protecting the debtor's
interest in particular kinds of exempt property; it permits the debtor
to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase money interests in that property
to the extent that the security interest impairs an exemption to which
the debtor would be entitled under the Bankruptcy Code. 124 The
collateral in which a nonpurchase money security interest may be
avoided includes (1) household furnishings, household goods, clothes,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, and jewelry
held for personal, family, or household use; (2) implements,
120. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1998). The goods in which the FTC prohibits the taking of a nonpurchase money security interest are clothing, furniture, appliances, one television and one
radio, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, and personal effects, but do not include works of art,
other electronic entertainment equipment, items acquired as antiques (items over 100 years
old), and jewelry (except wedding rings).
121. See Bankruptcy Code § 522(b) (1998).
122. See id.
123. See the listing in Bankruptcy Code, section 522(d). The bankruptcy exemptions are
limited in dollar amount in each category. Many states similarly have dollar amount limitations.
124. See Bankruptcy Code § 522(b).
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professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor; and (3) professionally prescribed health aids for the
125
debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
Therefore, it is often important to the individual bankrupt and
her secured creditor whether a particular security interest in any of
the items just mentioned is a "purchase money interest." Bankruptcy
courts have generally concluded that whether a security interest is a
purchase money interest for bankruptcy purposes is determined by
state law, 126 which is Article 9 of the UCC. As pointed out above,

whether a security interest is initially a purchase money interest is
relatively straight forward. The interest is a purchase money interest

if it is given in return for value that enables the debtor to acquire the
property. 127 However, events subsequent to the taking of the purchase

money security interest may affect its status.
Some bankruptcy courts have held that under Current section

9-107, a security interest that was originally a purchase money interest
loses that status entirely if the debt is restructured and an additional
nonpurchase money advance is made, 128 if a later purchase money

security interest transaction is consolidated with an earlier one, 129 or if
the purchase money debt is refinanced to extend the term. 130 If the

security interest loses its purchase-money status, the interest is subject
to avoidance if the collateral is exempt property under the
Bankruptcy Code. Further, if the creditor, relying on the Code's
automatic perfection rule for consumer goods,3 has not filed a

financing statement, the security interest will become unperfected if it
is no longer a purchase money interest. Therefore, the security party
will lose to the trustee in bankruptcy even as to nonexempt
property. 132

125. See id. § 522(f)(1)(B).
126. See, e.g., Gillie v. First State Bank (In re Gillie), 96 B.R. 689 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989);
Bond's Jeweler's, Inc. v. Linklater (In re Linklater), 48 B.R. 916, 918 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985).
127. See U.C.C. § 9-107; R. § 9-103(a), (b). Both sellers who take a security interest in the
sold goods to secure the unpaid part of their price and lenders who provide funds used by the
buyer to acquire the goods and take a security interest therein have purchase money interests.
128. See, e.g., In re Baker, 139 B.R. 468, 471-72 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Bechen v.
Livestock State Bank (In re Bechen), 11 B.R. 939, 942-43 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981).
129. See, e.g., Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
130. See, for example, In re Gillie, 96 B.R. at 689, 692, and the cases cited therein.
131. Under both Current and Revised Article 9, a security interest in consumer goods other
than collateral is subject to a certificate of title law, which requires notation of a security interest
on the title. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d); R. § 9-309(1).
132. See In re Manuel, 507 F.2d at 993.
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Courts that find that subsequent events completely terminate
purchase money status are said to apply a "transformation" rule
because the subsequent event transforms a purchase money interest
into a nonpurchase money one. Other courts, however, have held that
none of these subsequent events terminates purchase money status
and that the debt remaining after the subsequent event retains its
purchase money status to the extent that a part of the debt that was
incurred to acquire the goods remains unpaid.'33 Courts that reach this
result are said to apply a "dual-status" rule.
Courts that hold that a consolidation of two purchase money
interests or a consolidation of a purchase money interest with a nonpurchase money interest completely terminate the purchase money
character of the security interest do so on either or both of two
related reasons. First, say the courts, if the security interest in an item
secures anything other than that item's price, the interest cannot be a
purchase money interest, and, after a consolidation, the security
134
interest in the purchase money collateral secures both debts.
Second, after a consolidation, it cannot be determined which debt is
being paid, so the court cannot determine how much of the remaining
debt is purchase money secured debt. 135 The rationale for holding that
a refinancing, whether or not any additional credit is being advanced,
terminates the purchase money status of the security interest is that
the refinancing pays off the purchase money debt by a new loan or a
36
novation, which is not purchase money.
Current Article 9 has no clear indication whether the
"transformation" or the "dual status" rule was intended by the
drafters. But Current section 9-107 gives support to the dual-status
position because it states that a security interest is a purchase money
interest "to the extent that" it is given to enable the debtor to acquire
the goods. That language suggests that a single security interest might
be part purchase money and part nonpurchase money.
The drafters concluded that Revised Article 9 should clearly
adopt the dual-status rule. Revised Article 9 addresses the first
133. See, e.g., Billings v. Avco Colo. Indus. Park (In re Billings), 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir.
1988); Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc. (In re Pristas), 742 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1984); In re
Hansen, 85 B.R. 821 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
134. See In re Manuel, 507 F.2d at 992-93.
135. See id.; Bond's Jeweler's, Inc. v. Linklater (In re Linklater), 48 B.R. 916 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1985).
136. See, e.g., Hipps v. Landmark Fin. Servs., Inc., (In re Hipps), 89 B.R. 264, 266 (Bankr.
N.D.Ga. 1988).
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transformation rationale directly by providing that a purchase money

interest does not lose its status even though the purchase money
collateral also secures a nonpurchase money obligation or collateral

that is not purchase money also secures the purchase money
obligation. 137 Revised Article 9 deals with the problem of how to
apply payments after a consolidation of debts by providing a statutory
rule for the allocation of payments. 138 Also, Revised section 9-103

provides that renewal, refinancing, consolidation, or restructuring

139
does not terminate purchase-money status.
However, the drafters, following the general position that
Revised Article 9 should not change present rules, which are seen as
protective of consumers, excluded consumer-goods transactions from

its new rules that none of the three events that courts had held to

140
cause a purchase-money interest to lose that status has that effect.
However, as not all courts have applied the transformation rules, the

drafters were not willing to state affirmatively that the transformation
rules should apply in consumer-goods transactions.

Therefore,

Revised section 9-103(h) provides that the limitation of the "dualstatus" rules to non-consumer collateral is "intended to leave to the
court the determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods
transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature
137. See R. § 9-103(f)(1)-(2).
138. Revised section 9-103(e) reads:
In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, if the extent to which a
security interest is a purchase-money interest depends on the application of a payment
to a particular obligation, the payment must be applied:
(1) in accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the parties
agree;
(2) in the absence of the parties' agreement to a reasonable method, in accordance
with the intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time of payment; or
(3) in the absence of an agreement to a reasonable method and a timely manifestation
of the obligor's intention, in the following order:
(A) to obligations that are not secured; and
(B) if more than one obligation is secured, to obligations secured by purchasemoney security interests in the order in which those obligations were
incurred.
139. See R. § 9-103(f)(3).
140. Revised section 9-103(f) reads:
In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money security
interest does not lose its status as such, even if:
(1) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchasemoney obligation;
(2) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-money
obligation; or
(3) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or
restructured.
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of the proper rule in consumer-goods transactions and may continue
to apply established approaches."
To the extent that a bankruptcy court relies on the inability to
allocate payments after a consolidation of several purchase money
debts or a combination of a purchase money debt with a nonpurchase
money debt, there are several ways in which that inability to allocate
can be overcome: (1) the consolidation contract can specify the
allocation method; 4 1 (2) a statute can give a statutory allocation
method; (3) the court can itself determine an allocation formulation,
such as first in-first out;14 2 or (4) purchase-sales act or similar acts can
provide the allocation method. 143 Therefore, as noted above, if
another statute provides an allocation formula or if the credit contract
itself provides an allocation formula, the inability-to-allocate reason
for terminating purchase money status does not exist, independently
of Article 9.144 Therefore, that ground for voiding purchase money
interests may gradually disappear in any event.
141. In Bond's Jewelers, Inc. v. Linklater (In re Linklater), 48 B.R. 916, 919 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1985), the court applied the contract provision under which payments were first applied to the
oldest debts (first in, first out).
142. Under a first in, first out method of allocation, payments after a consolidation would be
applied to the first debt, and only after it had been paid off and the related security interest
discharged, would any payments be applied to the second debt. See In re Linklater, 48 B.R. at
919.
143. See In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 257, 268 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) ("Absent statutory or
contractual methods of [allocation], this Court can provide a judicial method of determining
how much of the debt is purchase money and how much is not.").
144. Also, it should be noticed, if an allocation formula is used, the argument that the
purchase money collateral is also securing nonpurchase money debt is not available when two
purchase money obligations are combined. The reason for allocation formulas is to show how
much of each subsequent payment is being applied to the individual purchase money secured
debt. Therefore, even though only a portion of the payment is discharging purchase money
debt, it is incorrect to conclude that the purchase-money collateral is securing nonpurchase
money debt. In the consolidation example given above, the $500 balance of a purchase money
secured debt in a television set is consolidated with a new purchase money secured debt of $800
in a refrigerator. The new monthly payment in the consolidated contract is $50.00. Suppose that
an applicable state statute or the credit contract provides that the monthly payment on the
consolidated debt will be applied in the ratio that each debt existing at the time of consolidation
bears to the total debt. If so, the new monthly payment of $50.00 will be applied 5/13ths ($19.23)
to the security interest in the television set and 8/13ths ($30.77) to the security interest in the
refrigerator. Under this system, the security interest in the television set will not be entirely
discharged until the entire debt is paid. Even so, it is incorrect to conclude that the security
interest in the television set also secures the security interest in the refrigerator. If bankruptcy
occurs with five payments remaining on the consolidated debt, the creditor has a purchase
money security interest of $96.15 in the television set and of $153.85 in the refrigerator. The
bankrupt, therefore, could discharge the security interest in the television set by paying the
$96.15 to the creditor. Of course, a purchase money lender who is already owed another debt
might provide that the security interest in the collateral being purchased also secures the
previous nonpurchase money debt, or on a refinancing that includes an additional nonpurchase
money advance, that the purchase money collateral also secures the additional advance.
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Hence, under Revised Article 9, courts may apply either the
dual-status or the transformation rule to consumer purchase money
interests after a refinancing or consolidation. However, courts are not
compelled to follow their present decisions on the matter; rather, they
"may continue to apply established approaches." It is difficult to
predict whether the courts that presently use the transformation rule
in bankruptcy will continue to do so. There are respectable policy
arguments that the transformation rule, while it protects the bankrupt
individual, is harmful to consumers generally because it reduces the
willingness of sellers or lenders to provide purchase money credit.145
On the other hand, it is understandable that a bankruptcy judge,
faced with the choice of allowing a secured credit to repossess
household goods that will have little resale value or allowing the
bankrupt to keep the goods that he would otherwise find difficult to
replace, may wish to continue to apply a transformation rule.
B. Descriptionof Collateralin Consumer Transactions
Current section 9-110 provides that "any description of personal
property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it
reasonably identifies what is described." Revised section 9-108
continues that provision,146 but imposes some limitations on the
effectiveness of general descriptions. The first limitation is that such
descriptions "as 'all the debtor's assets' or 'all the debtors personal
property' or [similar formulations] does not reasonably identify the
collateral" in the security agreement. 147 Such formulations, however,
are sufficient in the financing statement. 148 These rules concerning "all
assets" descriptions are not limited to consumer transactions.
Presumably, the reason for prohibition of such "supergeneric"
descriptions is that it is seldom that such a board reach is actually
intended, and such language is likely to appear in boilerplate
language that is unread by the debtor.
Revised section 9-108 specifically provides that descriptions by
"category," or by "type of collateral defined in the [Uniform
Commercial Code]" are sufficient. 149 However, in a consumer
145. See Robert M. Lloyd, Refinancing PurchaseMoney Security Interests, 53 TENN. L. REV.
1(1985).
146. See R. § 9-108(a).
147. Id. § 9-108(c).
148. See id. § 9-504.
149. See id. § 9-108(b)(2)-(3) (brackets in original). Revised section 9-105(d), somewhat
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transaction, description of the collateral as "consumer goods,"

"security entitlements," "securities accounts," or "commodity
accounts" is not effective."1 0 The statute does not specifically prohibit
the use of an "investment property" description in consumer
transactions. But "investment property" is a defined term that
includes the term "securities entitlements," "securities accounts," and
"commodity accounts," which are ineffective in consumer
transactions. Therefore, there should be no doubt that the use of

"investment property" is also ineffective in consumer transactions.
However, except as to the terms just discussed, there is no
limitation on the use of a description by "category" in consumer
transactions. Therefore,

a description

such

as

"all household

furniture," "all jewelry," or "all my mutual funds" may be by
"category" and therefore sufficient. However, an argument can be
made that such descriptions are too much like the prohibited
descriptions to be effective. Also, Revised Article 9 continues the

current prohibition of security interests in after acquired consumer

goods. 151 Therefore, collateral covered by a general description, like

"all my jewelry," may be uncertain, and ineffective, if some of the
apparent collateral was after-acquired property subject to the

prohibition.

52

C. Assignees Subject to Defenses-Absence of the FTC Legend
The Federal Trade Commission has made it an unfair trade
practice in sales or leases to consumers'53 for a seller or lessor to fail

to include in the consumer credit contract the following legend:

redundantly, states that a description of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity
account is sufficient if it uses those terms or the term "investment property." Those terms are
defined terms in the Code. See id. § 9-102(a)(14), (49); U.C.C. §§ 8-501, 8-102.
150. See R. § 9-108(e)(2).
151. Revised section 9-204(b) reads: "A security interest does not attach under a term
constituting an after-acquired property clause to: (1) consumer goods, other than an accession
when given as additional security, unless the debtor acquires rights in them within 10 days after
the secured party gives value." Current section 9-204(2) contains the same rule in slightly
different words.
152. See In re Johnson, 13 UCC Rep. 953 (Callaghan) (Bankr. D. Neb. 1973), in which the
Referee held that a security agreement claiming an interest in a debtor's acquired consumer
goods was invalid because it claimed property that the debtor would acquire more than ten days
after the security interest was taken. The Referee held the clause unconscionable because it
might mislead an unknowing consumer.
153. Under the FTC rule, a consumer is a "natural person who seeks or acquires goods or
services for personal, family, or household use." 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(b).
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NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF
GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO
OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY
HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT 1EXCEED
54
AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.

There is also a prohibition against the seller or lessor accepting as full
or part payment of the purchase price money from a related lender 55
under a loan agreement with the consumer which fails to contain a
similar legend.
Under the FFC rule, if the consumer credit contract does not
contain the legend and is represented by a negotiable note or by a
contract that contains a waiver of defenses clause, an assignee from a
seller, lessor, or related lender who extended the credit might be able
to assert that it does take free of defenses or claims of the buyer or
lessor under the holder in due course rules of UCC Article 3 or the
waiver of defense rules of Article 9.156 Revised sections 9-403(d) and
9-404(d) close that possible loophole by providing that if the FTC rule
requires that a writing contain the FTC legend but the writing does
not do so, the writing has the same effect as if the legend were
included, and the debtor can assert against the assignee those claims
and defenses that would have been available had the writing included
the legend. 57
154. Id. § 433.2(a).
155. A related lender is one to whom the seller refers consumers, or one who "is affiliated
with the creditor by common control, contract, or business arrangement." Id. § 433.1(d); see also
id. § 433.1(f)-(g).
156. If the transferee knows that it is receiving consumer paper that fails to include the
required legend, it is probably not in good faith if it tries to collect free of claims or defenses. If
it is not in good faith, then it would be subject to defenses in the law of negotiable instruments
or under the provisions of Current Article 9 (9-206). But if the assignee is not aware that the
paper is consumer paper, it might be able to enforce a waiver of defenses clause or assert its
right as holder in due course of a negotiable instrument to enforce the instrument free of the
debtor's claims or defenses. See the good short discussion in JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 17-9 (4th ed. 1995).
157. Revised section 9-403(d) reads:
In a consumer transaction, if a record evidences the account debtor's obligation, law
other than this article requires that the record include a statement to the effect that the
rights of an assignee are subject to claims or defenses that the account debtor could
assert against the original obligee, and the record does not include such a statement:
(1) the record has the same effect as if the record included such a statement; and
(2) the account debtor may assert against an assignee those claims and defenses that
would have been available if the record included such a statement.
Revised section 9-404(d) repeats the provision in slightly different words.
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Under the usual rule applied by courts, an assignee, even if
subject to claims or defenses, does not have to return payments
already received; the debtor can assert the claim or defense only to
avoid making further payments.158 Revised Article 9 codifies this rule
in section 9-404(b). 15 9 However, the FTC required legend may give
the buyer or lessor greater rights. The relevant language in the
required legend is: "Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not
exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder." The language does
not say directly that the debtor can recover amounts paid, but only
that the recovery cannot exceed amounts paid. Therefore, a holder
could argue that the actual recovery is governed by applicable state
law, which in the Article 9 context would be the rule of Revised
section 9-404(b) mentioned above. If that argument is accepted, the
presence of the FTC legend would not give rise to a right to an
affirmative recovery back of payments already made to the seller,
assignee, or lender, and similarly, if the legend should be in the
agreement but is missing, the Article 9 rule would apply.
However, the FTC in the proceedings leading to promulgation of
the rule expressly rejected a creditor proposal that the right given by
the FTC required legend be limited to asserting a defense to a suit by
the assignee. 16° In its comments accompanying the promulgation of
the rule, the FTC stated that consumers "will not be in a position to
obtain an affirmative recovery from a creditor unless they have
actually commenced payments and received little or nothing of value
from the seller. ' 161 Therefore, it is clear that the FTC intended that, in
at least some circumstances, the consumer be able to recover back
payments made to the assignee.
It is doubtful that the FTC has the power to change state law to
give a contracting party greater substantive rights than it would have

158. A few courts have held that payments made by a debtor to an assignee can be
recovered back on mistake theory, the mistake being that the debtor believed that the payment
was owed. However, the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 14(2) (1937) provides
that a payment cannot be recovered from an assignee if the assignee took for value, made no
misrepresentation, and had no notice of the defense. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr., The New
Payments Code and the Abolition of Holder in Due Course Status as to Consumer Checks, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 20-21 (1983).
159. The provision reads: "Subject to subsection (c) and except as otherwise provided in
subsection (d), the claim of an account debtor against an assignor may be asserted against an
assignee under subsection (a) only to reduce the amount the account debtor owes."
160. See 40 Fed. Reg. 53,556, 53,557 (1975).
161. See 40 Fed. Reg. at 53,527.
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under state law,'1 62 and in promulgation of the rule, the FTC stated
that it did not intend to change state law. 163 Perhaps the FTC lawyers
believed that state law already gave such a right if there had been a
material failure of performance by the seller. Even if state law does
not give such a right and the FTC did not intend to, or does not have
the power to, change state law in that way, it can be argued that the
legend amounts to a contractually binding promise by an assignee to
return payments received if there is a breach of contract by the seller
giving rise to a claim by the consumer-buyer.
If there is a right to an affirmative recovery, there seems no
reason of logic or policy to limit the affirmative recovery to
essentially complete failure of performance by the seller. Suppose, for
example, that a breach of warranty is discovered that causes the buyer
damages of $3,000 at a time when $8,000 has already been paid to the
assignee and only $2,000 remains to be paid. Should the buyer be
denied an affirmative recover of $1,000 because there has not been a
complete failure of performance?
Nevertheless, the few courts addressing the issue, without serious
examination of the issues raised above, have interpreted the effect of
the FTC legend in the way suggested by the FTC; they have allowed a
recovery back if there has been a material breach, but denied a
recovery back of payments made if the breach has been minor. 164 In
any event, whatever the rules of recovery are under the FTC legend,
those rules will apply to transactions in which the paper should have
carried the legend, even though the legend does not appear. Because
Revised Article 9 applies to security interests in, and sales of,
accounts, instruments, or chattel paper, 165 and because all the
transactions subject to the FTC rule will be either accounts,
instruments, or chattel paper under the Revised Article 9 definition
of those terms, all cases involving missing FTC required legends will
be within Article 9.166
162. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 156, § 17-9.
163. The FTC, interpreting the rule, stated that it did not intend to change substantive state
law. See 41 Fed. Reg. at 20,023-20,024.
164. See Felde v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 580 N.E.2d 191, 197-98 (Il. App. Ct. 1991); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Morgan, 536 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Mass. 1989).
165. See R. § 9-109(a)(1), (3). (Certain special situation assignments are not subject to
Revised Article 9. See id. § 9-109(d).)
166. The FTC rule applies to credit extended for sales or leases of goods. The Code
definition of accounts includes debts arising out of the sale or lease of goods except debts
evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. See id § 9-102(2). "Chattel paper" is a record or
records that evidences a monetary obligation and a security interest in, or lease of, specific
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D. When Does Consumer Buyer Have Rights as Buyer in Ordinary
Course?
Under Revised section 9-320(a)167 and Current section 9-307(1),168
a buyer in ordinary course takes free of a prior perfected security
interest in the goods. A person is a buyer in ordinary course if she
buys in good faith, in the ordinary course of the seller's business, and
without knowledge that the sale is in violation of the rights of
others. 169 However, under Current Article 9, neither section 9-307(1)
nor the definition of buyer in ordinary course 170 indicates whether a
171
buyer becomes such when the goods are identified to the contract,
when title passes to the buyer, 172 or as soon as the sales contract is
made if the goods can later be identified to the contract. Presently
173
there is case law support for each of the three positions.
Revised Article 9 and Revised Article 2174 clarify the point at
which a buyer becomes a buyer in ordinary course and state different
rules for consumers than for commercial buyers. Revised section
1-201(9) (revised in connection with the Article 9 revisions) provides
that "Only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to
recover the goods from the seller under Article 2 may be a buyer in
ordinary course of business." Two sections of Article 2 enable a buyer
to get goods from a seller. Section 2-716 allows the buyer to get
specific performance if the "goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances" and allows replevin of goods identified to the contract
goods. See id. § 9-102(11).
167. Revised section 9-320 reads:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer in ordinary course of business,
other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming
operations, takes free of a security interest created by the buyer's seller, even if the
security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.
168. Current section 9-307(1) is in substance the same as Revised section 9-320.
169. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (defining "buyer in ordinary course").
170. See id.
171. Under Current section 2-501, a buyer acquires a "special property" in goods on their
identification to the contract. Identification is the designation of particular goods to be delivered
under the contract and can be made by either the seller or the buyer.
172. Under Current section 2-401, title ordinarily passes to the buyer when the seller
completes its performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods.
173. See, e.g., Wilson v. M & W Gear, 442 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (when the contract
is made if the goods to be delivered can later be identified); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v.
Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 487 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (identification); Chrysler Corp.
v. Adamatic, Inc., 208 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. 1973) (title). Most courts hold that the buyer becomes a
buyer in the ordinary course when the goods are identified to the contract. See M & W Gear,
442 N.E.2d at 678-79 (Heiple, J., dissenting); CLARK, supra note 28, § 304[1].
174. A Revised Article 2 is nearing completion.
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if the buyer is unable to acquire substitute goods. 175 Revised section
2-502 permits a buyer for personal, family, or household purposes to
recover the goods from the seller if the goods are identified to the
contract, the buyer has paid part of the price, and the seller
repudiates or fails to deliver as required by the contract. 176 Therefore,

under Revised Article 9 and Revised 2-502, if a consumer buyer has
made a down payment and goods have been identified to the
contract, the buyer will be able to get the goods from a secured party
who repossesses them from the seller before they are delivered to the

consumer buyer.
Under the present Code, the definition of buyer in ordinary
77
course states that buying may be on secured or unsecured credit.

Therefore, a buyer can be a buyer in ordinary course even though no
part of the price has yet been paid. The new requirement that a

consumer buyer must have paid a part of the price to be a buyer in
175. Section 2-716. BUYER'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR
REPLEVIN.
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other
proper circumstances.
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as to
payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after
reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has
been made or tendered. In the case of goods bought for personal, family, or
household purposes, the buyer's right of replevin vests upon acquisition of a
special property, even if the seller had not then repudiated or failed to deliver.
176. Section 2-502. BUYER'S RIGHT TO GOODS ON SELLER'S REPUDIATION,
FAILURE TO DELIVER, OR INSOLVENCY.
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and even though the goods have not been
shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of goods in which he has a
special property under the provisions of the immediately preceding section may
on making and keeping good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover
them from the seller if:
(a) in the case of goods bought for personal, family, or household purposes, the
seller repudiates or fails to deliver as required by the contract; or
(b) in all cases, the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the
first installment on their price.
(2) The buyer's right to recover the goods under subsection (1)(a) vests upon
acquisition of a special property, even if the seller has not then repudiated or
failed to deliver.
(3) If the identification creating his special property has been made by the buyer he
acquires the right to recover the goods only if they conform to the contract for
sale.
Under section 2-501, a buyer has a special property in goods once they have been identified by
the seller or the buyer as the specific goods to be delivered under the contract.
177. "'Buying' may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured
credit and includes receiving goods or documents under a pre-existing contract for sale." U.C.C.
§ 1-201(9).
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ordinary course, therefore, cuts back the rights of consumer buyers
from dealers. 17 8 However, because if the buyer has paid no part of the
price, the secured party will ordinarily be happy to sell to the buyer at
the price previously agreed to between the buyer and seller, but (with
the delays incident to a foreclosure sale) there may be little change in
fact in the ability of a consumer-buyer who has paid no part of the
price to get the goods at the contract price.179 There is also the
possibility that a consumer buyer could get specific performance if the
buyer is unable to get the goods elsewhere under section 2-716 even
though no part of the price has been paid. If so, she could be a buyer
in ordinary course and take free of security interests under the buyer
in ordinary course rules. Of course, often a buyer who has paid no
part of the price will not want to get goods from a seller who has gone
into default under a security agreement.
In at least one case under Current section 9-307(1), a farmerbuyer was given buyer in ordinary course status as against a farm
implement dealer's secured creditor even though there had been no
identification of a specific item to the farmer's contract.1 8 That result
seems attractive to me, but might be somewhat difficult to square
with the new specific requirement that the goods be identified to the
contract for a consumer buyer to recover the goods under UCC
section 2-502. Perhaps a court could find a constructive identification
where the dealer has a number of identical items and it is clear that
the dealer intended to deliver one of them to the buyer.
Alternatively, a court might conclude that having paid a part of the
price to a seller who is in default on a security agreement is a reason
for granting specific performance of the contract under Article 2.181 A
178. See Kwikset Div. of Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Mohawk Indus. Design Enters., Inc. (In re
Pennsylvania Conveyor Co.), 31 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982); Holstein v. Greenwich
Yacht Sales, Inc., 404 A.2d 842, 843 (R.I. 1979).
179. The greater change in the law is as to commercial buyers. They will be buyers in
ordinary course only if the seller became insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first
installment on the price of the goods or if they can replevy the goods under section 2-716. See R.
§ 2-502. However, the March 1, 1999, draft of proposed Revised Article 2 (section 2-824) gives
the same right to commercial buyers as the Article 9 revision of section 2-502 gives to consumer
buyers.
180. The dealer contracted to sell a grain drill to the farmer. Dealer had several identical
drills in stock, one of which he intended to deliver to the farmer. However, before dealer
selected one to be delivered, his secured party took possession of the drills. The court held that
the farmer (who apparently had already paid the price) was entitled to one of the drills free of a
security interest created by the dealer. See Wilson v. M & W Gear, 442 N.E.2d 670, 671-73 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982).
181. Section 2-716 provides: "(1) specific performance may be decreed where the goods are
unique or on other proper circumstances."
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court can order specific performance even though the goods have not
been identified; the seller can be required to identify the goods and
182
deliver them.
E. Deferralto Other State Consumer Law on ContractModification
Between Assignor and Assignee and on Requirements for Notation to
Pay to Assignee
Current section 9-318(2) permits a debtor and creditor-assignor
to make modifications to the contract that are effective against the
assignee if the modifications are in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards. Revised section 9-405 continues a
183
similar rule but requires only that the modification be in good faith.
Revised section 9-405, however, contains a provision that the section
is subject to any other law that establishes a different rule for a
consumer obligor. 184 The writer knows of no other law that would
state a different rule for consumers and is not sure of the purpose of
the rule. Because the consumer-debtor is the obligor and because
Revised section 9-318(2) permits the obligor and the assignor (usually
a seller in a consumer transaction) to modify the contract without the
consent of the assignee if in good faith, the rule is favorable to
consumers. It is hard to believe that there is any state law which is
more favorable to consumers: surely a bad faith modification could
not be effective against the assignee. It is possible that persons asking
for an exception for consumer transactions misunderstood the effect
185
of the provision.
Revised section 9-406 sets out the requirements for a notification
of an assignment that obligates an account debtor to make payment
to the assignee 8 6 The section also renders ineffective contractual
restrictions on the ability to assign the rights of an obligee against the

182. Section 2-716 did not continue the Uniform Sales Act requirement that for specific
performance the goods must be "specific or ascertained." See Uniform Sales Act § 68. See
Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 38-40 (8th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 531
F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1975); and Stephan's Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. D & H Mach. Consultants, Inc.,
417 N.E.2d 579, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) in which the courts ordered specific performance,
which required the seller to deliver goods that were not identified at the time of suit.
183. See R. § 9-405(a).
184. See id. § 9-405(c).
185. It is the writer's recollection that the exception was requested by consumer
representatives.
186. See R. § 9-405(a)-(c).
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account debtor.1

87

This section also is subject to any other law that

88
establishes a different rule for a consumer account debtor.

F. ConsumerDeposit Accounts

Assignments of deposit accounts 189 are excluded from Current
Article 9 except as proceeds. 19° Assignments of deposit accounts as
security are brought into Revised Article 9, but not if the assignment
is part of a consumer transaction.' 9' Revised Article 9 limits "deposit

accounts" to accounts maintained with a bank. 192 Therefore, accounts
held with nonbanks, such as mutual fund companies or brokerage

houses, are not deposit accounts for purposes of the consumer
exclusion even though the consumer can make deposits and
withdrawals in the same way as she could with a bank checking

account.193 Such accounts are within Revised Article 9 as either

investment property' 94 or general intangibles. 195 Therefore, the use of

a money-market mutual fund as collateral in a consumer transaction
is covered by Revised Article 9 even though the consumer can draw
checks on the fund.

One reason for not extending the exclusion beyond accounts
maintained with banks is the difficulty of drawing a line between
excluded and included transactions based on some other test. Also,
187. See id. § 9-405(d).
188. See id. § 9-406(g).
189. Deposit account is defined as "a demand, time, savings, passbook or like account
maintained with a bank, saving and loan association, credit union or like organization, other
than an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e).
190. See id. § 9-104(1).
191. The relevant parts of Revised section 9-109 are:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this article applies to:
(1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal
property or fixtures by contract;
(d) This article does not apply to:
(13) an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction, but Sections
9-315 and 9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds.
192. See R. § 9-102(29) ("'Deposit account' means a demand, time, savings, passbook, or
similar account maintained with a bank. The term does not include investment property or
accounts evidenced by an instrument"). "Bank" is defined as "an organization that is engaged in
the business of banking." Id. § 9-102(8).
193. "The term 'deposit account' does not include 'investment property,' such as securities
and security entitlements. Thus, the term also does not include shares in a money-market
mutual fund, even if the shares are redeemable by check." Id. § 9-102 cmt. 12.
194. See id. § 9-102(49).
195. See id. § 9-102(42).
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excluding bank accounts will cover most situations in which
consumers representatives were concerned about creation of security
interests that might deprive consumers of the wherewithal for daily
expenses. It should be noted, however, that Article 9 does not
prohibit taking of security interests in consumer deposit accounts; it
merely excludes such transactions from Article 9. Therefore, on
common law principles, it may be possible to take a security interest
in a consumer bank account. 196 However, as a practical matter,
because if the uncertainties as to method of perfection of the interest,
exclusion of consumer deposits from Article 9 may preclude their use
as collateral. 197
G. New Protectionfor Consumer Consignors
Current Article 2 section 9-326 provides that goods consigned to
a consignee for sale are subject to the claims of consignee's creditors
while in possession of the consignee if the consignee has a place of
business at which the consignee sells goods of the kind being
consigned unless the consignor complies with a state sign posting law,
shows that the consignee is generally known to his creditors to be
substantially engaged in the business of selling the goods of others, or
the consignor files a financing statement under Article 9 and complies
with the additional notices required of a purchase money financer of

inventory under Article

9.198

Consumers often consign goods,

particularly such things as automobiles, boats, and travel trailers or
motor homes to dealers for sale.
The dealer does not buy the goods itself; it takes possession of
them to sell for the account of the consumer. Under UCC section
2-326, a consigning consumer could lose her goods to the creditors of
the consignee.
A number of states, believing that consumer-consignors should
not run such a risk, have excepted consumer consignors from the
provisions of UCC section 2-326.199 Revised Article 9, to which the
196. See Dwight L. Greene, Deposit Accounts as Bank Loan Collateral Beyond Setoff to
Perfection- The Common Law Is Alive and Well, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 259 (1989-1990).
197.

See PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ARTICLE 9, Document Nos.

19-26 (May 22, 1991) & Working Document No. M4-19 at 2-3.
198. See U.C.C. §§ 2-326, 9-114. (The consignor is also protected if the consignee is doing
business in the name of the consignor. See id. § 2-326.)
199. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE, § 2-326(5) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 84-2-326(5) (1996).
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consignment rules presently in section 2-326 have been moved,
exempts consumer-consignors from the claims of a consignee's
creditors. 200 If section 2-326 does not apply, then the consignor is
protected by the usual common law rule that a bailee's creditors get
no rights in bailor's goods held by the bailee.
H. State Law Limiting the Effect of Waivers of Defenses by Consumers
Revised section 9-403(e) continues the rule of Current section
9-206 that the provisions of Article 9 authorizing waivers of defenses
are subject to other laws of the state establishing a different rule for
201
consumers.
CONCLUSION

The Drafting Committee and the sponsoring organizations faced
a difficult problem in crafting consumer provisions that made policy
sense and would lead to support of, or at least lack of opposition to,
Revised Article 9 by both consumer and creditor groups. The
provisions ultimately agreed to are less than consumer
representatives wanted and more than creditors initially believed they
could agree to. Both groups showed statesmanship and willingness to
compromise in the course of the discussions on consumer issues. If
each group at times believed that the other group was woefully wrong
as to the appropriate policy, they nevertheless almost always listened
with respect. Not always, because at times tempers were frayed. But
the end result is, this writer believes, a credit to hard efforts made by
both consumers and creditors to produce a mutually acceptable set of
proposals.
The effect of new legislation is always somewhat doubtful. That
is true of the consumer provisions discussed here. The policy
argument for imposing additional restrictions on creditor behavior is
that consumers would be willing to bargain for and pay for the cost of
such restrictions if they had adequate knowledge and bargaining was
relatively cost free. But, of course, consumers usually do not have
adequate knowledge, and bargaining is costly. The provisions are,
therefore, a sort of insurance, paid for by all consumers with Article 9
200. See R. §§ 9-102(20), 9-109(4).
201. Revised section 9-403(e) reads: "This section is subject to law other than this article
which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred
the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."
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secured debt, that on default provides them some additional rights
and protections.
Whether the new consumer provisions provide benefits
commensurate with their cost remains to be seen. However, the
additional protections given consumer debtors are modest; it is
perhaps more likely that additional protections, such as attorneys'
fees for prevailing consumers, would be cost effective than that the
new consumer provisions actually included in Revised Article 9 will
not be cost effective.

